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Dilemmas in forward basing: understanding
the impact of the American military presence
in Bahrain

LaRow, Michael W.

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School

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NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE

SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

DILEMMAS IN FORWARD BASING: UNDERSTANDING

THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY

PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN

Michael W. LaRow

June 2014

Thesis Advisor:

James A. Russell

Second Reader:

Anne M. Baylouny

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

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2. REPORT DATE

June 2014

6. AUTHOR(S) Michael W. LaRow

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number_N/A_.

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The U.S. military operates and maintains a vast forward basing infrastructure in countries throughout the world.
Periodically, these bases become the central focus of either protest or violence from the citizens of the host nation.
Questions have recently surfaced as to whether NAVCENT headquarters in Bahrain is in danger of experiencing
protest or violence following the Arab Spring.

This thesis seeks to understand the causes of protest and violence toward U.S. personnel stationed overseas. To
answer this question, this thesis uses case studies from base conflicts in Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey to analyze
the friction points between the host nation citizens and the U.S. military base.

This thesis finds that the main friction points for conflict fall into three categories: economic, military, and social.
The most common friction point in the three case studies is the impact of U.S. military operations on the host nation,
with the exception of Bahrain. Bahrain is unique because military operations have not caused resentment to date
within the current government or the opposition movement. Despite this lack of conflict, NAVCENT’s position in
Bahrain is by no means secure, since economic causes, present in the Bahrain case, have caused the most vociferous
protests when present.

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Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

20. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

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PAGES

14. SUBJECT TERMS Arab Spring, Bahrain, Demonstrations, Germany, Peace Movement, Protest,
Forward Basing, Okinawa, Turkey, Friction Points

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CLASSIFICATION OF THIS
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Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

DILEMMAS IN FORWARD BASING: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF
THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

Master’s Thesis

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

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DILEMMAS IN FORWARD BASING: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF
THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN

Michael W. LaRow

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Colorado State University, 2002

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2014

Author: Michael W. LaRow

Approved by: James A. Russell

Thesis Advisor

Anne M. Baylouny
Second Reader

Mohammed M. Hafez

Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. military operates and maintains a vast forward basing infrastructure in countries
throughout the world. Periodically, these bases become the central focus of either protest
or violence from the citizens of the host nation. Questions have recently surfaced as to
whether NAVCENT headquarters in Bahrain is in danger of experiencing protest or
violence following the Arab Spring.

This thesis seeks to understand the causes of protest and violence toward U.S.
personnel stationed overseas. To answer this question, this thesis uses case studies from
base conflicts in Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey to analyze the friction points between
the host nation citizens and the U.S. military base.

This thesis finds that the main friction points for conflict fall into three categories:
economic, military, and social. The most common friction point in the three case studies
is the impact of U.S. military operations on the host nation, with the exception of
Bahrain. Bahrain is unique because military operations have not caused resentment to
date within the current government or the opposition movement. Despite this lack of
conflict, NAVCENT’s position in Bahrain is by no means secure, since economic causes,
present in the Bahrain case, have caused the most vociferous protests when present.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.1

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.1

B. BACKGROUND.1

C. IMPORTANCE.2

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES.5

E. DEFINITIONS.6

F. LITERATURE REVIEW.6

G. METHODS AND SOURCES.13

II. OKINAWA.15

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS.15

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS.20

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS.22

D. CONCLUSION.24

III. GERMANY.27

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS.27

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS.28

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS.35

D. CONCLUSION.35

IV. TURKEY.37

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS.38

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS.38

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS.45

D. CONCLUSION.45

V. BAHRAIN.47

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS.47

B. MILITARY FICTION POINTS.50

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS.52

D. CONCLUSION.59

VI. CONCLUSION.61

A. FINDINGS.61

B. LESSONS LEARNED.63

C. RECOMMENDATIONS.64

D. IMPLICATIONS.65

LIST OF REFERENCES.67

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.71

vii

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Friction Point Matrix

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BAPCO

Bahrain Petroleum Company

BICI

Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

CENTO

Central Treaty Organization

CNU

Bahrain Committee for National Unity

GCC

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

GRI

Government of the Ryuku Islands

HLG

NATO High Level Group

INF

Intermediate-range Theater Nuclear Forces

LDP

Japanese Liberal Democratic Party

MARCENT

Marine Forces Central Command

NAVCENT

Naval Forces Central Command

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

PACOM

Commander of U.S. Pacific Forces

PRV

plant replacement value

RAF

Red Army Faction

Revolutionare Zelle

SOFA

Status of forces agreement

TLP

Turkish Labor Party

USCAR

U.S. Civilian Administration of the Ryuku Islands

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INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the conditions under which citizens
protest or become violent against American military service members serving at major
overseas U.S. military installations, and to detennine whether these conditions exist in
Bahrain.

B. BACKGROUND

During the Cold War, the United States developed a vast infrastructure and
network of military bases on foreign soil in an attempt to use these strategic locations to
contain and deter the communist threat. Despite the Cold War being over, the U.S. has
maintained this large overseas military structure in what Chalmers Johnson has given the
rather controversial label as “America’s Empire.” 1 The exact size of U.S. installations
and their number of personnel is so large and in some cases so classified that it is difficult
to ascertain. The official count according to the Department of Defense FY2012 “Base

Structure Report” is 666 overseas military installations, with 21 of them being what the

military considers to be “large sites” based on Plant Replacement Value (PRV).

Over the years, the countries and citizens that play host to these installations have
filed legitimate complaints concerning effect of the U.S. military on a wide range of
concerns. People have protested the effect that U.S. troops have on the local economy,
the conduct and criminal behavior of U.S. personnel, the hazards created by the
placement and operation of military equipment, as well as violations in national
sovereignty in the use of the installation in carrying out the foreign policy efforts of the
U.S. government. These complaints often play out in the political arena between
diplomats, or the complaints become more public as citizens protest in front of U.S.

1 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 2000), 5.

- U.S. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report : FY 2012, 23. PRV is calculated by estimating
the cost in terms of today’s construction costs and techniques to replace the buildings and infrastructure. A
large base would be considered a PRV of $1.75B.

installations to voice their concerns. In some cases, the protests are enough to force
policy change by at least hindering the U.S. military’s ability to operate, and at the
extreme end, these protests can turn violent, causing hann to U.S. military personnel. By
examining the protests against the presence of U.S. service members in Okinawa,
Germany and Turkey, we will see what the common friction points are and which ones
caused the greatest negative reaction or outrage from the citizens of the host nation.

C. IMPORTANCE

The United States has bcncfitted from a positive relationship with the ruling al-
Khalifa family in Bahrain for over the last sixty years. Bahrain is host to the United
States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) headquarters and has signed a
formal defense pact in 1991 making Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally.” The Sunni al-
Khalifa family has held non-democratic/authoritarian power on the island kingdom since
1783, and has ruled over the majority Shia population that currently makes up 60-70% of
the kingdom’s population. 4 Protests regarding human rights violations and the lack of
Shia representation in Bahraini government have been in existence as early as the 1920s,
well before the Arab Spring, but these grievances really came to light and gained
international attention during at the protests at Pearl Roundabout on February 14, 2011. 5
Since then, human rights organizations have specifically highlighted alleged systematic
torture by the Bahraini Security Forces against the Shia protestors. The U.S. State
Department (DOS) also acknowledged these claims of abuses in a human rights report in
2011. 6

Violence on the island has continued since the government crackdown on Shia
protestors in February 2011. A moderate opposition group called the A1 Wefaq Islamist
National Party organizes regular occurring protests against the monarchy. In April 2012,

^U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RL 95-1013 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Research
Service, November 6, 2012), i.

4 Ibid., 1.

5 Ibid., 7.

6 Ibid., 22.

an improvised explosive device killed seven Sunni members of the national police force.
Sunni citizens then retaliated by attacking Shia owned businesses. In June 2012, bomb¬
making materials were found in several locations around the island, and in November
2012 five explosions killed two non-Bahrainis. 7 The use of car bombs has become more
regular in 2014 beginning with the explosion of a car bomb on April 7, 2014 in the
largely American populated area of Manama during the 2014 Bahrain Formula One
Grand Prix. 8 While no one was injured in the April 7th incident, two people were killed
and a third was severely wounded by later car explosion only 12 days later on April
19th. 9

While the April 7th Grand Prix attack was not successful, and it is speculated that
those killed by the April 19th car bomb were killed by their own device, it has started to
cause some to speculate as to whether or not this level of violence will become the new
nonn. A1 Wefaq has been silent following these attacks, and has not been active in
condemning nor condoning the violence. These violent events coupled with the silence
by the moderate opposition leaves many questioning whether the mainstream opposition
is starting to give way to more violent organizations like the February 14th Youth
Coalition, which has recently been labeled a terrorist organization by the Bahraini
government. 10

The events surrounding the Arab Spring coupled with this recent escalation in
violence puts the United States is in a difficult position between the Bahraini government
and the protesting citizens. The U.S. benefits greatly from the island’s strategic physical
location near the Strait of Hormuz and from the development of the NAVCENT
headquarters on the island. The U.S. also gains legitimacy throughout the Persian Gulf
and with other countries in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

7 Ibid., 16.

8 “Blast Rocks Bahrain During Grand Pri x,” Aljazeera, April 7 2014,
http://www.aliazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/Q4/blast-rocks-bahrain-diiring-grand-prix-

201447675399917.html

9 “Two killed in Bahrain Car Explosion,” BBC News, April 19, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-27086763 .

10 Elizabeth Dickinson, “Bahrain’s Disappearing Moderates,” Al -Monitor, April 22, 2014, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/bahrain-violence-opposition-moderates-disapperaing.html .

(GCC) through a strong political alliance in Bahrain. Bahrain has been a major regional
ally during some of our recent conflicts in the Persian Gulf. During Operation Desert
Storm, Bahraini pilots flew strike missions in Iraq and in retaliation; the Iraqi Army fired
nine scud missiles at the island kingdom. 11 Following the World Trade Center attacks on
9/11, and in the opening stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Bahrain played
host to thousands of U.S. troops as they moved into the theater and the island became the
new forward headquarters for Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT). Bahrain
also allowed combat missions to be flown from Shaykh Isa Air Base during OEF and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and is one of only two Gulf Nations to deploy their own

forces to Afghanistan.

Amidst the latest protests and accusations of human rights violations, the White
House has not called for the al-Khalifa royalty to step down to opposition like it has in
other cases during the Arab Spring. This is due in large part because the use of force by
the al-Khlaifa regime appears to be less drastic than the crackdown tactics used by Assad
in Syria, Qadhafi in Libya, or even Mubarak in Egypt. 14 Despite this appearance of less
drastic tactics, human rights organizations are critical of the White House’s position and
accuse the U.S. of turning a blind eye to Bahrain because of its strategic partnership. 15 As
of yet, the elite Sunni citizens of Bahrain have not criticized the United States for its
implied suggestions on expanding democracy within the Bahraini government, nor has
the U.S. been the target of Shia attacks or protest for at least passively supporting the al-
Khalifa regime. As tensions continue and with little movement in the way of democratic
change on the island, the potential for conflict between U.S. military personnel and the
citizens of Bahrain exists. If the U.S. supports the Shia opposition, it loses its critical ally
in the ruling al-Khalifa family with their strong ties to Saudi Arabia and the U.S. will lose
an ally in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). Conversely, if

11 U.S. Library of Congress, Bahrain: Reform, 24.

David F. Winkler, Amirs, Admirals & Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 197.

15 U.S. Library of Congress, Bahrain: Reform, 25.

14 Ibid., 17.

15 Ibid.

the U.S. continues to support the ruling Sunni minority, the presence of U.S. personnel
could become an outlet for Shia frustrations for at least tacitly supporting an oppressive
regime.

Problems with forward basing are not new, and past conflicts over the presence of
the U.S. military and equipment on foreign soil have been seen in Okinawa, Gennany,
and Turkey. By examining the friction points that caused protests or violence between
these host nations and the U.S. bases located within their borders, we may be able to
detennine the potential causes for protest or violence against U.S. personnel living in
Bahrain. As of yet, the U.S. has not encountered a significant threat or complaint about
the presence of or our troops in Bahrain, but that does not mean the potential does not
exist. Identifying the root causes of tensions between the host nation’s citizens U.S.
military personnel will give commanders insight on how best to deal with both our
political position and presence in Bahrain.

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

There are two hypotheses that can be formulated by conducting a comparison of
U.S. forward basing experiences in Germany, Okinawa, and Turkey. The first, posits that
the same triggers for conflict in these three nations also exist in Bahrain. This hypothesis
would therefore predict that based on these comparisons, we would find that the triggers
for anti-Americanism are present in Bahrain and that conflict stemming from our military
presence and foreign policy will happen. The second hypothesis posits that Bahrain is
somehow unique and in particular that the elites and leaders of the opposition movement
in Bahrain (primarily A1 Wafeq) are not calling for a violent protest or outrage against the
United States and their control in keeping the dialogue between the protestors and the
royal family has kept the opposition movement focused on the Bahraini Government.
This hypothesis would predict that the key factor in igniting anti-American sentiment in
Germany, Okinawa and Turkey is the mobilization of the elites toward anti-
Americanism, and if this is not present in Bahrain Americans would not be at risk to
hostile acts or protests. The conclusion for the second hypothesis, then, only holds as

long as those leaders continue to avoid making the American presence the main issue.
That decision itself could change due to future variables.

If the evidence supports the second hypothesis, it does not mean that there is
nothing to be learned from past basing experiences. As the effects of the Arab Spring
continue to ripple throughout the Middle East, Bahrain could find itself anywhere in a
broad spectrum of change ranging from regime change as seen in Egypt or Tunisia, to
what has become a bitter sectarian war such as the situation in Syria. It is best to
determine the potential causes for conflict now, while the Kingdom of Bahrain seems to
be at a stalemate, and the day-to-day life of service members remains largely
uninterrupted.

E. DEFINITIONS

Due to the complex nature of social movements, and the fact that they rarely have
single variable causes, this thesis will attempt to divide the causes into three major
friction points. The first category contains the economic consequences of having U.S.
personnel operating in another country, and will be labeled Economic friction points.
Examples of economic friction points may include the purchase, rent or seizure of land
for use by the American military, or possibly what role the base plays in local economy
by hiring local laborers, or purchasing goods and services from the local economy. The
second friction point will be labeled Military. Examples of military friction points include
the effect the base and U.S. military operations have on national security and sovereignty
by having the military conduct operations from national territory. The third friction point
will be labeled Social. This friction point will contain the consequences and cultural
disputes of having U.S. service members live among a foreign population. Examples of
social friction points include crimes committed by U.S. service members against citizens
of the local community as well as conflicts that originate from cultural misunderstandings
or possibly outright racism.

F. LITERATURE REVIEW

Much of what has been written concerning the impacts of forward basing seems

to follow the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the

existence of U.S. bases on foreign soil served to counter the Soviet threat, but now that
the war has ended, the reasons for maintaining these bases has been called into question,
and therefore this where much of the current argument begins. Chalmers Johnson and
many others who write on this topic often use the word “empire” with all intended
negative connotations to describe our post-Cold War military structure. Much of this
literature examines the political effects of forward basing while some examine the
broader social implications of service personnel being deployed overseas.

In the case of Chalmers Johnson’s book Blow back, there are both political and
social consequences. Johnson posits that it is time for America to examine its need for
forward deployed bases now that the Cold War has ended. Johnson believes the U.S.
government is now doing whatever it can within its power to maintain this vast structure
without the Cold War justifications, and this is problematic. Johnson states that without a
communist threat, a “balance sheet” of grievances against the U.S. military will begin as
crimes are committed and accidents occur, and this will lead to resentment against all
Americans. 16 Johnson also fears that the maintenance of our military structure overseas is
creating a scenario of unintended social and political consequences that will plague the
United States for years to come due to its financial and political cost.

Johnson, Alexander Cooley, and David Steinberg all use Okinawa as the classic
case and point for the problems caused by basing troops on foreign soil. Okinawa was the
scene of a hard-fought battle between the U.S. and Japan in World War II. By the close of
fighting, an estimated 14,000 Americans and 234,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians
were killed before Japan surrendered the island following the horrible three month long
campaign. 17 From 1945 to 1972 the island was governed by the U.S. military and was
used as a staging point to fight war in Vietnam. By the 1960s, the U.S. had built more
than 100 bases on the island by taking lands from Okinawan citizens who had no rights or
legal protections after Japan’s surrender. By the end of the 1960s, complaints about
brothels, the placement of nerve agents and B-52 bombers as well as bars and crimes

16 Johnson, Blowback, 5.

17 Johnson, Blowback, 30.

related to troops on the island reached created a tense environment and the U.S. returned

governing of the island to its citizens.

By the 1990s, events on the island erupted when three servicemen raped and
killed a 12-year-old schoolgirl. As details of the crime were released, 85,000 citizens took
to the streets to demand the removal of the all forces and bases on the island. 19 Okinawa’s
governor Ota Masahide used the rape case as a cause to announce the renewal of private
land leases of military installations. This move was ultimately put down by the Japanese
court system in 1996, and Ota gave up his campaign after the Japanese prime minister
promised a substantial monetary package for Okinawa’s development along with a
promise to help reduce the presence of U.S. troops and to relocate them to other parts of
the island where they would not be as intrusive." The Japanese government also created
a special ambassador to Okinawa to help smooth American and Okinawan relations. The
U.S. military created programs and regulations to curb drinking off base and established
community outreach programs to help soften the image of U.S. troops. The situation
remains tentative to this day as the U.S. looks to reposition forces and equipment on the
island of Guam and has begun forward basing Marines in Australia.

Much of the literature on the situation in Germany in the late 1970s to 1980s has
less to do with the actions of U.S. service members and is focused specifically on the
placement of nuclear weapons on German soil under NATO’s intermediate-range theater
nuclear forces (INF). Jeffrey Boutwell describes how the INF proved to be an explosive
topic across many of West Gennany’s social movements, because the issue touched
many levels of society. The German idea of Ostpolitik began to gain a large audience as
citizens began to feel the need to begin rapprochement with East Germany rather dig the
trenches of the Cold War even deeper. Gennan citizens found themselves at the mercy of

18 Ibid., 50

19 Brad Glosserman, “Anti-Americanism in Japan” in Korean Attitudes toward the United States:
Changing Attitudes, ed. David I. Steinberg (New York: ME Sharpe, 2005), 38.

20 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democracy, Change, and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2008) 152.

21 Ibid., 154.

NATO, the U.S., and the USSR creating a volatile environment. Boutwell sees the INF
issue as a merging two German sentiments, “One strand is German uneasiness with
American security policy, and the other uneasiness is with American society in general as
a model to be emulated.” The result was an outpouring of hundreds of thousands of
people who took to the streets calling for disarmament and the withdrawal of U.S.

personnel and bases.

While Boutwell does not delve into specific acts against Americans, J.F. Pilat
makes note of targeted terrorism at the United States. He explains that German hostilities
towards the presence of American troops existed well before the INF debate but they
grew in audacity and violence under the antinuclear movement. As the rise of the
antinuclear protests began to gain popularity, far right German terrorist groups began to
exploit this momentum. In 1981, the first terrorist attacks occurred in August with a
bombing at Ramstein Air Force Base that injured 20 people including military and
civilian personnel. In September, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army in Europe
and his wife were targeted when his armored Mercedes was attacked by RPG fire and
small arms fire. These attacks seemed to die down as the peace movement favored
nonviolent protest, and as President Regan and the Soviet General Secretary Mi kh ail
Gorbachev went to the negotiating table to sign the INF Treaty in 1987 balancing the size
of the U.S. and USSR arsenals. 26

In the case of Turkey, the literature tends to lean more towards Anti-Americanism
as a whole rather than a debate about the presence of U.S. troops, but the root of much of
this sentiment seems to point to the use of Turkey by the United States as a staging point
for projecting power in the Middle East. In his paper, “Friends No More? The Rise of

22 Jeffrey Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany,” International Security 7,
no. 4 (1983), 73, http://www.istore.org/stable/2626732 .

23 Ibid., 79.

Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement,” 72.

23 J.F. Pilat, “European Terrorism and the Euromissies,” Terrorism 7, no 1, (1984), 66,
http://dx.doi.org/10.lQ8Q/105761Q8408435560 .

2 ^ U.S. Department of State, “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of
Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles
(INF Treaty),” http://www.state.gOv/t/avc/trty/102360.htm .

Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,” Ioannis N. Grigoriadis notes that anti-
Americanism in Turkey is unlike the liberal, social, or radical type, seen in other regions;
instead it takes on a sovereign-national flavor. Nur Bilge Criss agrees with this
sentiment and believes that it stems from the notion that Turkey is the heir to the Ottoman

Empire with a long tradition in statehood.

Following Turkey’s entry into NATO, it allowed its territory to be used in defense
of communist powers and saw America as an extension of NATO and therefore allowed
the U.S. broad access to its territory. Issues over sovereignty began in the 1960s
following the forcible grounding of a U2 spy plane that taken off from the American Air
Force base in Incirlik. Turkey denied knowledge and responsibility for the flight, but the
Soviet Union held Turkey accountable as third party to U.S. spying. Following another
incident in which a spy plane crashed into the Black Sea, the Turkish government began
to exercise more control over U.S. installations, attempting to limit U.S. actions to only
NATO operations. 29

By the late 1960s, Turkish politics became severely divided and the left leaning
Turkish Fabor Party (TFP) began to speak out against U.S. bases on the basis of
sovereignty. During an appearance at a Central Treaty Organization meeting, the U.S.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk was greeted by a protest from faculty from Ankara
University and a leftist trade union demonstrating on behalf of Turkish citizens employed
on the U.S. bases. This is an important moment in U.S.-Turkey relations because it is the
first time anti-American slogans were shouted on the streets. Another incident in 1968
against U.S. personnel was sparked by a visit of the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet. As sailors
arrived in Istanbul, they were met by protesting students and some sailors were thrown
into the Bosporus. This is another important event because in the riot that ensued a
student was killed by Turkish security forces, sparking a deep divide between leftist who

22 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More? The Rise in Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,
Middle East Journal 64, no. 1 (2010): 51, JSTOR (10.3751/64.1.13).

28 Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” The
Journal of American History, 89, no. 2, (2002), 472, http://www.istor.org/stable/3092168 .

29 Ibid., 474.

30 Ibid., 477.

-J 1

felt Turkey was ready for revolution and the right attempting to maintain control. U.S.
concerns grew larger by 1969 andl970 when the left attacked a U.S. ambassador’s car
and in a separate incident kidnapped U.S. personnel. The U.S. began to feel these attacks
were the exception not the rule in Turkey, but recognized these actions had considerable
influence on students and the press. Anti-American sentiments were exacerbated in
1974 when the U.S. established an embargo on Turkey due to its conflict and intervention
in Cyprus. Turkey again felt this was an affront on its sovereignty and responded by
closing all American installations/

The latest installment of conflict over U.S. personnel and Turkish sovereignty
came in 2003 when President Bush asked to use Turkey as a point to invade Iraq. Turkey
objected fearing retaliation from Iraqi Kurds, and the drain on the economy caused by the
flood of refugees. 34 The result of not allowing the U.S. to attack Iraq from Turkish soil is
lack of trust between the two nations. Turkish media about the war highlights this lack of
trust in its anti-American rhetoric comparing President Bush to Hitler, or displaying
fictionalized events of gum chewing soldiers shooting Iraqis at a wedding in a popular

• 35

movie.

These events in Turkey highlight a growing lack of trust and understanding where
Turkey’s sovereignty is concerned. Despite all these negative feelings toward American
violations to policy, it is important to note that Turkey remains a strong ally as Incirlik is
used to carry out NATO and U.S. policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The base serves as a
cargo hub and refueling point for flights going to Afghanistan, and also houses a large
store of nuclear weapons. Turkey presents a case where tensions seem to be at least

31 Ibid.

33 Aylin Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” Middle Eastern Studies 44, no.3,
21 (2008), 475, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200802Q21632 .

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 477.

35 Ibid., 482.

3 6 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues
and U.S. Views, by Carol Migdalovitz, CRS Report RL34642 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional
Information and Publishing, November 28, 2101), 50.

warming for the moment, but have proven political outrage over U.S. policy can result in
violence and hostilities toward U.S. personnel.

The literature concerning the American presence in Bahrain tends to examine the
recent events of the Arab Spring in 2011 as well as the close relationship between Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain as evidenced by Saudi Arabia’s assistance in the suppressing the
rebellion in Bahrain. U.S. Navy Commander Richard McDaniel perhaps sums up the
Saudi-Bahrain relationship by saying “Saudi Arabia will never allow Bahrain to fall as

'in

long as Saudi Arabia remains stable.” Despite having a strong ally across the causeway
that connects Bahrain to mainland Saudi Arabia, the odds of Bahrain remaining stable
seem less likely. The island’s population is approximately 65% Shia with a 35% Sunni
minority. 38 The third tier in Bahraini society is the ruling al-Khalifa family from the
Sunni sect. Unemployed Shia youth make up a large portion of the protestors. Shia are
faced with higher unemployment, and see the Sunni lead government as slow in creating
democratic reform and adherence to the recommendations made by the Bahraini
Independent Commission of Inquiry, Harsh crackdowns on Shia protestors only seems to
exacerbate the situation. 39

Given the tensions and civil unrest, the U.S. could find itself in a position where
its continual support for the Al-Khalifa family could make the U.S. presence politically
unpopular. If the U.S. continues to do nothing or act slowly, the Shia uprising may
eventually find the U.S. government act as an enabler in any violent responses to protest
by the authorities. In this situation, the United States may need to consider moving the
NAVCENT headquarters or change its position on the island. 40

Further examination is needed to determine whether or not any aspects of the
current situation in Bahrain reflect any of the previous experiences in Okinawa,
Gennany, or Turkey. We can already see some similarities between the economic,

3 ^ Richard McDaniel, “No Plan B: U.S. Strategic Access in the Middle East and the Question of
Bahrain,” Center for 21 st Century Security and Intelligence, Policy Paper (2013) 7.

38 Ibid., 8.

39 Ibid., 8.

40 Ibid., 11.

military, and social conditions in all of these countries. As of yet there have been no
outward protests or hostilities against American personnel in Bahrain. This thesis will
attempt to see what causes problems at U.S. foreign bases, and will examine the current
situation in Bahrain to see if any similarities exist, or determine if Bahrain is somehow
unique. In any case, this trip around the globe in the perils of U.S. basing is worth a
closer look as the situation in Bahrain continues to develop.

G. METHODS AND SOURCES

I will use a comparative study approach, comparing the problems in American
basing in Okinawa, Germany, and Turkey to see if they yield any similarities to the
situation in Bahrain following the Arab Spring. As of yet, there has not been an
outpouring of anti-American sentiment or significant attacks on US personnel, but I
would like to see if the potential exists, and possibly identify any social or economic
markers the US should look for to aid in making future decisions regarding NAVCENT
and its personnel.

I will use a variety of sources to include scholarly journals, policy papers,
newspaper articles as well as the Report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of
Inquiry (BICI) presented in November 2011. I will also use books that examine the
history American overseas basing to help gain a general understanding of our basing
structure and experience

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. OKINAWA

An examination of DOD and U.S. activities on Okinawa following WWII will
show that there is direct link between a significant anti-base movement and the
previously defined economic, military, and social friction points. In economic terms, the
primary point of contention between the U.S. and Okinawan citizen’s is rooted in how the
U.S. acquired a significant base structure that today takes up 20% of Okinawa’s landmass
of only 454 square miles. 41 Military friction points result from a wide range of military
activity which ranges from the carrying out of combat missions over North Vietnam in
the 1960s to the nuisances and environmental hazards created by the day to day
operations and training of the armed forces. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a series of
crises sparked social activism and the largest anti-base protests over issues ranging from
crime committed by U.S. service members to the impacts of military activity on the
environment. Okinawa is an excellent case study in base politics, because each one of
these friction points sparked waves of protests with various sizes at different periods.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

Economic problems between the U.S. military and the citizens of Okinawa are
centered on the seizure of land for use by the U.S. military. How the U.S. acquired the
land dates back to the conclusion of World War II and the details of the peace agreement
made with the Japanese. The conflict over the land began immediately following the war
and continues to this day. Of all the friction points examined, the economic effect of
obtaining land for use by the U.S. is the longest running and perhaps the most volatile
friction point being studied. Okinawa was an independent island kingdom separate from
Japan until the later 19th century when it became integrated into Japan as a province. The
island is perhaps best known for the battle that took place there during World War II from
April to June 1945. This was the scene of one of the last and possibly one of the bloodiest
battles in the Pacific Theater in World War II. The three-month campaign claimed the

Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 166.

lives of over 14,000 American servicemen and 234,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians 42
The toll exacted on the civilian population was so costly, that nearly one-third of the
island’s inhabitants were either killed in the fighting, or were killed by the hands of the
Japanese by various methods including forced suicide. 4 ’ To put the human cost into
perspective, the fighting in Okinawa exacted a similar death toll to that of the atomic
bombs being used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 44 While much of this history is common
knowledge to the average American or serviceman, the island’s crucial role in the
conflicts that follow, and the island’s status as a pseudo American military colony are
probably lesser known.

The American military occupied both Okinawa and mainland Japan from 1945
until 1952 when the Japanese-American Security Treaty was signed. Under the
conditions of the treaty, the Japanese mainland was able to regain its sovereignty, but
Article III of the treaty left Okinawa in a controversial status. Okinawa was to remain in a
possession of Japan, but the island would be under the administration of the United
States, military “with no guarantees of reversion until the security situation in East Asia
allowed it.” 45 Under a concept known as residual sovereignty, the U.S. military would
establish the U.S. Civilian Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and a parallel
government called the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) that would fonn the
executive, parliament, and judicial system for the indigenous people. The USCAR
appointed the governor of the GRI until 1968, and had the power to veto all executive
orders and judicial decisions “subject to the requirements of military security.” 46 This
meant that the American military could act similarly to a colonial power in the centuries
prior, and they began by taking land from the Okinawan people for military use.

Right away, land seizures by the American military generated social protest as
farmers and landowners were evicted from their homes. According to the testimony of

42 Johnson, Blowback, 38.

43 Brad Glosserman, “ Anti-Americanism in Japan, ” 43.

44 Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons : 166.

43 Cooley, Base Politics, 145.

46 Ibid.

Okinawan Governor Ota Masahide in 1995, immediately following the battle on
Okinawa, the U.S. military confined indigenous survivors into camps and began to
enclose privately owned lands for military installations. Ota stated, “It was done as if
drawing lines on a blank map. When residents were allowed to come home from the
camps, they found their hometowns had disappeared behind barbed wire.” 47 Land was
seized at gunpoint throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most famous case is the
land where the Sobe Communications Facility now stands. In 1945, the farmer owning
the land was shot to death while he attempted to hold off U.S. troops with a bamboo pole.
The grandson of the farmer is a famous antiwar landlord named Shoichi Chibana.

By 1953, approximately 14% of Okinawa’s landmass, much of it fannland was
acquired through various means of force, by deception or by purchase. Deception is one
of the least know yet surprising tactics made by the U.S. in acquiring land. In the 1950s,
U.S. officials promised Okinawan landowners plots of land in Bolivia along with aid and
assistance in emigrating in exchange for land on the island. Unfortunately, upon arriving
in Bolivia many found their new jungle land holdings to be unsuitable for fanning and
the promised aid was never delivered. The new colony located north of Santa Cruz
referred to, as “Colonia Okinawa” never really developed as many of the settlers
succumbed to the hazards of their new climate and died of disease or fled to urban areas
in Bolivia, Brazil, or Peru. 49 Of the 3218 settlers sent to Colonia Okinawa, from the
1950s to early 1960s only 806 remained by the year 2000. Those who remained in the
colony have become relatively successful farmers but only after years of hardship. 50

By 1956, the land debate boiled over when the U.S. developed a new policy for
paying Okinawan land owners one low lump sum instead of paying an annual rent. On
June 20, 1956 the announcement of this new low payment policy ignited outrage across
the island and 160,000 demonstrators took the streets to demonstrate their dissatisfaction
known. The U.S. government eventually succumbed to the demands of the landowners

47 Johnson, Blowback, 52.

48 Cooley, Base Politics, 146.

49 Johnson, Blowback, 52.

50 Ibid., 53.

and agreed to pay annual rents to the individual owners, but it should be noted that by the
early 1960s an estimated 50,000 landowners were driven out through coercion, or were
expelled by force accounting for 52,000 acres of the 76,000 acres occupied by the U.S. 51

The occupation and lease of land continued to be a major issue between the base
and the Okinawan citizens into the 1960s when activism increased. In 1962, the
Okinawan legislative body passed a unanimous vote accusing the United States of
practicing colonial rule despite United Nations (UN) provisions against such policies.^
By the 1960s, all political parties on Okinawa generally favored reversion back to
mainland Japan for governance rather than the American rule established under the
Japanese-American Security Agreement. While there seemed to be unanimous agreement
on reverting back to Tokyo for governance, there was a disagreement among Okinawan
political parties on what should be done with the U.S. military. On the one end of the
spectrum, the Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party sought out a plan that kept the U.S.
military presence intact at its current level. Those on the opposite end of the spectrum,
particularly the Okinawan socialist and communist parties sought a complete withdrawal
of the U.S. in entirety. Regardless of where Okinawans stood on the base issue, the
agreement on reversion was strong.

In 1965, Japanese Prime Minister Sato planned a trip as the first Japanese Prime
Minister to visit Okinawa since the end of World War II. He hoped this trip would help
gain national support in his quest for reversion. To a certain degree this was a successful
visit, as he was seen driven to tears and other emotional displays after being met by large
crowds of up to 30,000 people and as he toured various sites and World War II
memorials on the island. 54 The political left was less impressed by Sato’s gesture and
took the opportunity to voice their opinion against a reversion plan that would allow a
U.S. military presence. Many leftist organizations including the Reversion Council, the

51 Cooley, Base Politics, 147.

52 Ibid.

Ibid.

54 Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese
Relations (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000) 137.

Okinawan Teachers’ Association, Okinawan Peoples Party, and various labor unions held
a protest rally at a local high school that drew 10,000 people to the streets. A torch lit
procession found its way to the hotel where Sato was expected to return in an attempt to
“grab him and throw him out.” 55 While the crowd gathered, Sato was dining on an
American base at the Fort Bunker Officers Club where he chose to remain until the
crowd had died down. While waiting on base, the Prime Minister sent a representative to
negotiate with the rally’s leaders. Once negotiations and the acceptance of a petition
began, the crowd diminished to approximately 1000 people. At 2:30 a.m. the Okinawan
police charged the remaining protestors battling for nearly an hour before the streets were
cleared. Sato remained in VIP housing on base overnight rather than return to his off base
hotel. This act of seeking refuge with the Americans did little to gain him favor with the
left. Despite the protest and the fallout from hiding out on the American base, this visit by
Sato was seen as a turning point and reversion began to gain legitimacy. 56

Due in part to his polices on Vietnam, President Nixon preferred to have allies
take on a larger role in their own defense and security and as an acknowledgement of
Japan’s regained strength, and Nixon agreed to sign the reversion treaty. 57 James Lampert
signed the Reversion Treaty on May 15, 1972 on acting on behalf of the Nixon
administration. In the end, Japan and the U.S. each got what it desired. Under the treaty,
Okinawa went back to the control of the Japanese government, and the U.S. was allowed
to keep its bases. The left political actors on Okinawa remained disenfranchised by the
treaty, because it did not stipulate the reduction or removal the American presence.
However, the treaty did appeal to those who work on the bases, have regular business
interests with the base economy, and landowners are still make some profit from the rents
collected. 58

55 Ibid., 138.

56 Ibid.

57 Sarantakes, Keystone: 192

58 Ibid., 192.

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS

The conduct of military combat operations in the Vietnam War, and the day-to-
day use of bases by military aircraft and artillery units on Okinawa caused multiple
complaints and protests from Okinawan citizens. In the 1960s, Okinawans brought base
operations to a standstill on two occasions by protesting the use of Okinawa as staging
point for the bombing North Vietnam. From the 1980s-2000s concerns over
environmental damage, and noise pollution grew. Also, a large protest following the
crash of a military helicopter near a populated city caused Tokyo and the U.S. to propose
building a new base in a remote area of Okinawa as well as moving the U.S. Marines
located at Futenma to Guam. All of these events have created a culture on Okinawa that
has grown weary of having to live with the negative effects of the U.S. military
operations that impact their daily lives.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 brought anti-war activism to the
forefront in Okinawa. Many Japanese and Okinawan citizens sympathized with the North
Vietnamese given their own experiences with U.S. bombing campaigns on Japanese
cities in WWII. 59 Prime Minister Sato’s administration in Tokyo voiced concerns that the
left were gaining support in response to American actions in Vietnam, which would be
seen as detrimental to both Tokyo and the U.S. Despite these reservations, the mainland
Japanese government conceded that the U.S. could use Okinawa as per the security
agreement to bomb North Vietnam, but remained troubled by the unilateral actions made
by the U.S. 60 Despite being authorized by the security agreement and with at least the
tacit approval of Tokyo, Okinawa was not used extensively to support combat operations
over North Vietnam. The bases mostly served as combat support operations focused on
activities such as supply, communications, and even rest and recreation. 6 'There were a
few attempts to launch combat missions to Vietnam from Okinawa, but these were met
with great resistance from Okinawans.

59 Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 190.

60 Schaller, Altered States, 191.

61 Sarantakes, Keystone, 142.

The first attempt by the U.S. Air Force to send B-52 bombers from Okinawa to
Vietnam was in 1965. The negative response from the Okinawans was overwhelming as
they mobbed the gates of Kadena Air Force Base in an attempt to stop the operations
from occurring. The impact of the protest was large enough that it was three-and-a-half
years before the Air Force bombers made a second campaign to strike to Vietnam from
Kadena. The second round of bombing only lasted a few weeks as commanders realized

their missions and the ability for the bases to operate could be halted or even shut down

by local laborers going on strike over the sorties.

Jet noise and the day-to-day operations of aircraft flying in and out of Okinawa
also became a source of contention between the U.S. and Okinawans. In the 1980s, 906
residents of Kadena and Chatan village filed noise pollution complaints and lawsuits
from the jet noise created by aircraft operating out of Kadena Air Force Base. Sixteen
years after the suits were filed, the Japanese Government agreed to pay ¥1,373 million to
those plaintiffs who were still alive. While this proved to be expensive for Tokyo, the
U.S. continues to fly even in the late evening hours because Japan is not allowed to
interfere with base operations under the security treaty. 64

The American use of depleted uranium rounds in training on Okinawa caused a
large environmental protest and made headlines in the U.S. and Japan. An estimated
1,520 depleted uranium shells were fired on Torishima Island from December 1995 to
January 1996. This was done despite the fact that American policy stated these rounds
could only be used on designated ranges on the mainland of United States. 65 Fearing
backlash from Okinawan citizens, the military began a cleanup campaign in March 1996,
but only 192 of the shells were recovered. This deeply embarrassed the Japanese Prime
Minister, and the Japanese administration was forced to conduct damage control in the
media once the news broke. 66

62 Ibid., 43.

Johnson, Blowback, 48.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 49.

66 Ibid.

A 2004 incident surrounding the crash of a Marine helicopter near a local
university on Okinawa brought about a significant protest over the concerns stemming
from the hazards of flight operations on the local people. Once it was revealed that the
crash was the result of human error and improper maintenance, a large crowd of
approximately 30,000 people gathered to demand the closure of the base in Futenma.
Tensions over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) heightened as U.S. military
officials sealed off the crash site refusing to allow local investigators access under the
protection of the SOFA agreement. As a result of this round of protests the government in
Tokyo agreed to relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam by the year 2014, and begin new
construction for a helicopter base at Cape Henoko. 67 It should be noted that at the time of
this writing, no movement has been made on new construction or moving the Marines off

z:o

Okinawa, and the new date for this transfer to has been adjusted to 2020.

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

The issue of rape and crime perpetrated by U.S. personnel on Okinawan citizens
ignited the largest protest seen since the land purchase protests in the 1950s. 69 By the
1990s, anti-American sentiment still remained strong in the Okinawan political
landscape. Crime became highlighted by many of the interest groups with anti-American
platforms that arose out of the reversion era. These groups gained an additional boost as
they gained support from international NGOs and local labor unions following a
particular rape incident in 1995. Adding further fuel to the fire is the lack of cultural
awareness by the Pacific Fleet Commander, and the negative social impacts of racist
Americans stationed on Okinawa.

The brutal gang rape and murder of a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl by
three U.S. service members in September 1995 set off a series of protests around the
island and caused 85,000 Okinawans to go to the streets and call for the removal of U.S.

67 Cooley, Base Politics, 158.

68 Gaynor Dumat-Oldolano, “Admiral Gives New Date For Marine Move to Guam,” Marine Corps
Times, March 7, 2013, http://www.marinecorpstimes.eom/article/20130307/NEWS/303070304/Admiral-
gives-new-date-Marine-move-Guam .

66 Glosserman, “ Anti-Americanism in Japan, ” 38.

bases. This event is significant in size and support, because for the first time,
Okinawans gained sympathy and support from citizens on mainland Japan and anti-base
NGOs from other Asian nations. The murder also resulted in the voluntary retirement of
Admiral Richard C. Macke, the commander of U.S. Pacific Forces (PACOM), after he
made insensitive comments on how the accused could have just purchased a girl for the
price of the car they rented. 71

The two main newspapers on the island that have anti-base historical roots in their
publications, both ran extensive coverage on the 1995 rape incident. In the two months
that followed the rape, the Okinawa Times ran 348 stories related to the case and the
SOFA details that kept the accused from local prosecution. Of the 348 stories only ten
actually covered the facts of the case while the remainder focused on demands for change
in the American presence. Initially the story did not get much coverage in mainland
Japan, but after the story made headlines in the U.S. particularly the Washington Post and

New York Times mainland sources then wrote 400 stories raising national awareness.

As previously stated, NGOs also played a major role in the national dialogue
following the murder case. The Okinawan Women Against Military Violence attended
United Nations functions where it partnered with similar groups and anti-base NGOs
from Korea and the Philippines. The women against violence NGO also united multiple
Okinawan groups who were focusing on single issues to unite in one cause with
international clout. These now united NGO’s provided support then Governor Ota
Masahide who ran a campaign to pass a referendum to remove the bases from Okinawa
in their entirety. 74

The governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide was unable to pass an anti-base
referendum calling for the removal of American personnel by popular vote; despite
receiving backing from various national and international NGO’s and the media. The

70 Ibid.

7 1 Johnson, Blowback, 37.

7 ^ Cooley, Base Politics, 154.

73 Ibid., 155.

74 Ibid., 155.

referendum was broadly worded leaving it to be all encompassing on basing issues in
order for it to gain the largest possible appeal in order to challenge the mainland’s
authority on the basing issue. The referendum failed despite what appeared to be
overwhelmingly vocal support. Instead of having the expected large turnout of voters, an
unusually low turnout of only 53% of eligible voters made their way out to vote on the
ballot. The low turnout is attributed to a no show campaign organized by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and other pro-base factions such as private land lords who
collect rents from the bases, local businessmen, a base workers group, and members of
the self-defense force. 75

Ultimately, Governor, Ota was voted out of office and a Tokyo-backed LDP
candidate Inamine Keichi took the seat in 1998 by running on a campaign that accused
Ota of placing the anti-base movement before Okinawa’s economy. In the end, Inamine’s
promises of economic reform combined with incentives from Tokyo proved to be more
powerful than social concerns in gaining the vote of the young people facing a high
unemployment rate. 76 The three murderers were charged, tried, and convicted in Japanese
court. They were dishonorably discharged from the military, and were sent to Japanese
prison for terms ranging from six-and-a-half years to seven years, based on their
involvement. 77

D. CONCLUSION

After examining anti-Americanism in Okinawa following WWII, we see that this
sentiment stems from economic, military, and social friction points. Of the three the
longest and deepest-rooted sentiment involves the economic impacts of land acquisition.
Conflict began immediately following World War II as farmers defended their lands, and
carried into the 1950s when people protested over the low lump sum purchases from the
American government. Anger stemming from acquisition of land and military presence

75 Ibid., 156.

76 Ibid., 157.

77 Michael A. Lev, “3 Gis Convicted In Okinawa Rape Japanese Court Sentences Each To At Least 6
1/2 Years,” Chicago Tribune, March 7 1996, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-03-
07/news/9603070150 1 marine-pfc-okinawa-sentence .

also spilled over into the reversion of Okinawa back to the Japanese government in the
1960s forcing the visiting Japanese Prime Minister to take refuge on an American
military base. The economic friction points are likely to continue so long as the American
presence remains. The vague nature of the security agreement that allows the U.S. to
operate on the island until the security situation is resolved will keep the U.S. in Okinawa
so long as the Japanese government and the U.S. remains concerned over an expanding
China and North Korean nuclear threat.

Military operations on the base during Vietnam sparked protest twice, causing the
Air Force to cease operations. Later, in the 1980s-2000s the impact of day-to-day
routines of military operations and their effects on people and environment will also be a
source of protest. These activities prompted some of the and smallest protests and
shortest in duration but also some of the most severe as citizens crowded the main gates
and a threat of labor strikes nearly brought the base to a standstill. With the current
security situation in Asia, it will be interesting to see if this sentiment resurfaces or if it
will remain donnant as a tradeoff for American protection. We will see in later chapters
that how the U.S. uses its base in theater and what equipment it operates will have a large
impact in anti-American sentiment in Germany and Turkey. While this friction point
appears cause the smallest protest in duration in Okinawa, it will be echoed again in other
regions making this one of the more universal.

There appears to be an overarching sentiment that citizens should be safe from
American personnel, and this notion has broader appeal, as it seems to negatively affect
the lives of the average citizen more so than economics, and military operations. Social
issues involving crime committed by base personnel particularly the 1995 rape and
murder caused the largest wave of protest on Okinawa since WWII. The reason for the
massive turnout and public outrage in the media is largely due to sympathy gained from
not only mainland Japan but from anti-base NGOs operating in other countries. This
supports the notion that social friction points can gain a larger appeal than economics and
military activity. The Okinawan government attempted to harness this issue and its broad
appeal to citizens in order to unite those opposed to the American presence, but failed to
pass the base removal referendum once the populace considered the economic impacts.

Social friction points seem to affect the population at large and gamer greater support
across boundaries. Crimes committed by American personnel and other acts deemed
offensive to the social conscience are extremely serious, and should be considered in
location where American personnel are likely to have a lot of contact with the local
population.

III. GERMANY

West Germany in the 1970s and early 1980s presents us with another example of
protest against military personnel and bases overseas. Germany is an interesting case
study in that the economic and social effects of the U.S. military presence played a lesser
role in creating conflict. Instead, much of the hostilities were a response to U.S. military
activities and in particular the placement of U.S. Intermediate-range Theater Nuclear
Forces (INF) missiles on German soil in order to protect NATO. To understand how the
placement of nuclear weapons could cause such criticism and violence, one must also
understand that Germany was experiencing political turmoil as a result of being a divided
country caught between the influences of NATO and the Soviet Union at the height of the
Cold War. This chapter will examine the German political climate, and how the decision
to place INF missiles in Germany brought the Peace Movement and the leftist terror
groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) together and focused their efforts on the
U.S. military.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

There is little evidence to show that the presence of military personnel had a
negative effect on the German economy. Evidence points to the contrary by showing that
certain aspects of the peace treaty following WWII allowed for economic prosperity.
Many attribute economic success to Germany relinquishing control of its security policies
to the United States. 78 With Germany unable to pursue security policies, it left them with
cheap defense solutions, which came from the United States, and allowed Germany to
focus on better integration and economic achievements with the rest of Europe. 79 By the
time reunification occurred, Germany was established as a democratic federal state that
was “economically integrated, solidly anchored in the European community, and
preoccupied with internal and regional problems of reconstruction and development, to

78 Harms W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 5
(1990), 96, http://www.istor.org/stable/200446Q3 .

79 Ibid.

which traditional military power has no relevance whatsoever.” 80 That is not to say that
everything was perfect in Germany, after all, it was a nation divided, but economically
speaking Germany faired far better than Okinawa following WWII.

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS

NATO’s decision to place INF missiles in Europe was initially thought to be a
resounding success and a display of NATO solidarity against the Warsaw Pact, but it
proved to be anything but a success in German domestic politics. A brief look at the INF
decision will show that the planners and decision makers failed to take into consideration
the internal politics of Gennany and ignored elite driven social movements and terror
attacks that already occurring. Anti-nuclear protests were staged in West Germany the
1950s well before the NATO missile plans surfaced in 1979, and violence against U.S.
military service members in West Germany certainly existed before this period with
extremist groups such as the RAF, and the Revolutionare Zelle (RZ) bombing U.S.
targets in the 1970s. 81

In February 1978, a High Level Group (HLG) meeting consisting of NATO
alliance members was held in Los Alamos New Mexico. This was the third of such

meetings, but this was the most important as it was the first occasion that alliance

members came to a consensus that a modernization of NATO capabilities was required.
The exact language stated that NATO needed “an evolutionary upward adjustment” in
long-range theater nuclear forces with the capability of striking targets in the Soviet
Union. 83 The request for new technology or upward adjustment was sought to counter
the placement of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European theater. Initially,
members of the Carter Administration and the DoD were uneasy with the idea of
enhancing NATO’s capabilities and felt the HLG was getting ahead of itself. The Carter
administration called for a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM-38) to determine the

80 Ibid.

8 ' J.F. Pilat, “European terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 66.

83 Raymond L. Garthoff, “The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces,” Political Science
Quarterly, 98, no. 2 (1983): 202, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149415 .

83 Ibid., 202.

best course of action. After conducting the review, and after personally traveling to
Europe to test the international political climate, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, found that the U.S. did not have the
incentive or the military need for more a more robust nuclear missile requirement for
NATO, but agreed to proceed so long as the enhancement in capabilities met “European

political-military concerns.”

PRM-38 detennined that the best way to enhance long-range capabilities was to
use ground launch cruise missiles, or sea-based cruise missiles from submarines and war
ships. The third option was the newly developed intennediate range Pershing II ballistic
missile. Many NATO countries indicated that they preferred a land-based system to a
sea-based system because the land-based was “politically more ‘visible’ and
demonstrative of resolve.” 86 The final decision on whether or not to pursue a new nuclear
capability on European soil was made at the presidential level in January 1979 when
President Carter met with French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, British Prime
Minister James Callaghan, and German Chancellor Schmidt. Chancellor Schmidt
accepted the placing of missiles on German soil with two stipulations; first, Gennany
could not be the only country in continental Europe to have INF in their borders. Second,
there must be an effort to negotiate arms limitations to respond to West Gennan
constituents that might oppose missile deployment. In his own memoirs, President
Carter referred to Schmidt as “contentious” on the issue. Though Carter does not state
the specifics on why the Gennan Chancellor would be contentious, this thesis would posit
that this is a reflection of Gennany’s internal political climate.

In the spring of 1979, the HLG had made its final decision to deploy both ground
launched cruise missiles and the U.S. Army’s Pershing II missile. The U.S. suggested a

84 Ibid.

8 ^ Ibid.

86 Ibid., 203.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., 204.

89 Ibid. 203.

range between 200-600 missiles total. 90 More than this amount would be deemed too
aggressive, and less would be considered too weak in terms of maintaining the detente
with the Soviet Union. 91 Ultimately, the Carter administration authorized 572 missiles in
order to match the Soviet capabilities and achieve the political goal of displaying alliance
unity. " In July 1979, package of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched
cruise missiles was agreed upon and the campaign to gain political approval from all
NATO countries began. It is at this point that political opposition on the national level
began to surface. Italy agreed to accept some of the missiles, while the Netherlands and
Belgium were “contingently prepared to do so but with reservations and political
uncertainty.” 94 Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev denounced the new missile plan and
proposed a reduction in Soviet assets in theater if the new NATO missiles did not go
forward. 91 ’ In a rare move, the Soviets also launched an extensive media campaign in
Western Europe with high-level officials giving interviews and statements to the western
press. In these interviews, the Soviet officials claimed that a nuclear balance already
existed and the deployment of the missiles was not necessary, and was in fact a
provocation. The Soviet campaign ultimately failed, due in part by a counter campaign
from the United States, but it did cast doubt in the minds of western public over NATO’s
motives. 96 Despite waning political support, the U.S. conducted a “concerted campaign to
ensure a full deployment decision and commitment...coupled with agreement to pursue

the arms control approach.”

By the summer of 1981, public unrest over the missile deployment began to
spread across Europe. Under the organization of what was to become known as the Peace
Movement, an estimated 1 million people participated in demonstrations throughout

Ibid

,205.

Ibid

,206.

Ibid

,207.

Ibid

,207.

Ibid

Europe and in the vicinity of Bonn. The Peace Movement embodied a wide range of
political ideologies and interests. Members ranged from communists, to religious clergy
both Catholic and Protestant, pacifists, socialists and social democrats, feminists, extreme
leftists, West German peace research institutes, and disaffected youth." Once the INF
plans went forward, these groups became united behind a single cause. Initially the Peace
Movement lacked the support of political parties in the West German government, but
once the Green Party got involved in the nuclear arms debate, the Peace Movement
gained political representation in what became an anti-system party. 100 A petition kn own
as the Krefeld Appeal was sent to the Gennan Chancellor containing over 1.5 million
signatures calling for the retraction of the INF missile plan is an example of the Peace
Movements new found unity and broad base support. 101

On a political level, the Peace Movement was clearly anti-NATO and anti-
American, but it is important to note that most members of the Peace Movement also held
“strong anti-Soviet sentiments.” 102 Both the Peace Movement and the Green Party
received funding and support from Moscow and East Germany, but on the whole they
were “no more enamored of Soviet society than they are of American.” 10 ’ Members of
the movement desired a new security arrangement, but were divided on how the new
security framework should look. Some sought a new framework that would unite all of
Europe as a third major power in the Cold War, while others had nationalist goals and
desired a “demilitarized, neutral, reunited Germany.” 104 In either case, these sentiments
within the Peace Movement reflected in German Society as a whole. Polls show that
positive support for the U.S. and its policies fell when President Reagan took office. By

98 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “Western Europe: Cycles, Crisis, and the Nuclear Revolution,”

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 469, (1983): 94,
http://www.istor.org/stable/1044538 .

99 Pilat, “European terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 65.

* 90 Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany,” 81.

101 Ibid., 80.

102 Wifred von Bredow, “The Peace Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany: Composition
and Objectives,” Armed Forces & Society 9, no. 33 (1982): 46, https://afs.sagepub.eom/content/9/l/33 .

103 Boutwell, “Politics and the Peace Movement in West Germany,” 84.

104 Ibid., 85.

1983, “some 61 percent of German respondents believed that the United States, like the
USSR, was a country intervened in the internal affairs of smaller countries.” 105

The INF issue also drew the attention of the extremist groups in Germany who
were already critical of NATO and Europe’s subordination to the U.S. through the
alliance. The extreme left felt that the U.S. was a global imperialist power that used
NATO as its military arm. The extreme right used saw the U.S. and NATO presence as
unnecessary with the declining threat of Soviet invasion. One of the right’s slogans was
“foreign troops go home.” 106 The left had already been active attacking U.S. personnel in
the early 1970s well before the HLG’s missile decision in 1979. The RAF had bombed
the Officers’ Club in Frankfurt and the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters in Heideberg in
1972. 107 Between the two events, four people were killed and 18 were injured. 106 It
should be noted, that the RAF did not attack military personnel again until the end of the
1970s. The Revolutionare Zelle (RZ) and the Bewegung 2 Juni also attacked U.S. targets
before the INF deal in the mid-1970s. The RZ bombed the U.S. Army’s V. Corps
headquarters and the Officers’ Club at Rhein/Main Airbase in 1976. In 1978, the RZ
attacked a U.S. military barracks at Karlstadt. 109 These attacks caused casualties, but they
were considered sporadic and were “never systematic until the movement opposed the
INF missiles in the 1980s.” 110

Seizing the opportunity and momentum created by the Peace Movement, leftist
extremist organizations like the RAF began taking advantage of the spreading anti-
NATO and anti-American sentiment by actively recruiting new members to their cause.
Prior to the INF debate, the RAF’s support and numbers were low following a successful
West German counterterrorism campaign in the 1970s but the missiles gave the

165 Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and
the Changed image of America in West Germany,” International Security 12, no. 1 (1987): 57
http://www.istor.org/stable/2538917 .

106 pii a t 5 “European Terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 64.

107 Ibid., 65.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

organization new vigor and its leadership an opportunity in seizing the growing tide of
European and Gennan nationalist tendencies. 111

The RAF acted on the anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment early on, and in
June of 1979 the RAF attempted to assassinate General Alexander Haig who was serving
as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The RAF had planned to detonate
a bomb on the bridge going to NATO headquarters in Brussels while the General’s car
passed over it. Fortunately for the General, the bomb detonated after his car had safely
passed over the bridge and he was uninjured. “ In 1980, the RAF planned to strike
multiple targets in Gennany where the Peace Movement had its largest support base.
These targets included Ramstein Air Force Base, and the Hammond Barracks, however

••113

these plans were interrupted and never came to fruition.

In the summer of 1981, the RAF and other terror groups had enough support in
Germany to launch multiple attacks on NATO personnel and U.S. The first attack was the
August 31, 1981 bombing at Ramstein Air Base that injured 20 service members and
civilian workers. A second attack that summer occurred when the RAF attempted to kill
the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Anny in Europe General Fredrick Kroesen. The
RAF fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and fired several shots into the General’s
annored car while he was traveling with his wife. Again, fortunately for the General the
RPG detonated on the truck of the car shattering the rear window that only caused minor
injuries to the General and his wife. The very next day, the leftist terrorist group the
Revolutionare Zelle (RZ) placed bombs on the train tracks that entered the Rhein-Main
Air Base in support of demonstrators who were protesting the plans to enlarge runways at
the airfield. 114 In 1982, other terrorist groups with anti-NATO and anti-American
leanings including the Schwarzer block and Antifa began targeting the cars of service
members with arson attacks by placing bombs under the seats. Extreme right groups
attempted to employ similar tactics and are accredited for targeting cars belonging to U.S.

111 Ibid., 66.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 67.

personnel in Buzbach, Darmstadt, and Frankfurt. No deaths came as a result of these
bombs, but one service member was seriously injured. 115 For whatever reason, luck or
planning, these attacks on military members and NATO targets proved to be largely
unsuccessful, and with the exception of the attack on the generals, they were not very
spectacular. Even though they were unsuccessful, the violence certainly did not sit well
with the leadership of the Peace Movement.

The Peace Movement became concerned at the violence being conducted by

members acting on the periphery on the movement following the RPG attack on General

Kroesen. 116 The more moderate Peace Movement members realized these anti-NATO

and anti-American attacks would create a security situation that would prohibit them

from voicing the peaceful message and using peaceful methods. 117 The Peace Movement

leadership felt compelled to set the proper tone by staging demonstrations that were

largely passive reflecting the notions of the movement’s mainstream members. Despite

security apprehensions by European governments, a large-scale peace protest was

planned on the weekend of Easter Sunday 1983. These demonstrations were carried out

in a more “carnival atmosphere, with a profusion of music, flowers, and balloons.” 119 The

only instances of hostilities were minor instances of tear gas being used to disperse

protestors. On Good Friday, hundreds of protestors in Neu-Ulm Bavaria blocked the road

to the U.S. Army’s Wiley Barracks. German police responded with tear gas and dogs to

120

disperse the crowd. In the end, only two people were arrested and the dogs injured two.

The INF missiles were eventually deployed to Europe and by the mid-1980s the

121

Peace Movement had lost its momentum. ~ The missiles were what gave the Peace
Movement its large moderate support base and, once the missiles were deployed the

115

Ibid

116

Ibid

117

Ibid

118

Ibid

,69.

119

Ibid

120

Ibid

121

Ibid

70.

122

incentive for moderates to maintain the protest was lost. " Moreover, the dual track plans
to deploy the missiles and open talks with the Soviet Union over arms control appeared to
be working. One of the Peace Movement’s last major appearances occurred when
President Regan and then General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik in
1986. The Peace Movement organized a march consisting of 150,000 Germans to
demand the removal of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe, but this would be
one of their last major protests as talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union

123

continued.

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

There was certainly a social aspect to the INF debate with both the Peace
Movement and the radical fringes entering fray, but it is important to keep in mind that
these movements gained support from a reaction to U.S. military and NATO security
policy. In Germany, we do not see the level of disregard or racism that was seen in
Okinawa. The U.S. Navy’s PACOM Commander’s comments regarding the purchase of
girl in Okinawa is indicative of the social attitudes that caused so much social upheaval
on Okinawa. Racism and lack up cultural understanding do not seem to play as
significant a role in Gennany.

D. CONCLUSION

The cases of Okinawa and West Germany are similar in that the activity of the
U.S. military brought about a series of protests that united a broad spectrum of interests
groups and won the support of moderates. The placement of U.S. military equipment and
how it was used to affect policy brought out large numbers to protest in both countries.
The major differing factors between these two case studies is that the duration of conflict
in Germany was shorter than Okinawa, and the Peace Movement in Germany also
attracted violent extremists and terrorist organizations that operated on the periphery by
using the popularity and support of the Peace Movement to further their extremist causes.

122 Ibid.

I 22 Mueller and Risse-Kappen, “Origins of Estrangement,” 52.

Incidents of violence and protests against military personnel were not a new
phenomenon in West Germany before the INF debate, but these previous attempts were
sporadic and did not become systematic until the missile crisis began. The violence and
the level of protest increased and decreased in unison public support of the Peace
Movement. It should be noted that the Peace Movement leadership were able to control
the violence by taking control of their protests as exemplified in the Easter Protests of
1983, but the violence ultimately tapered off along with the Peace Movement once the
missiles were deployed and the moderate base no longer saw the benefits of opposition.
The RAF continued to operate until 1992 when the RAF issued a cease-fire statement to
the media indicating its defeat as a result “ideological fatigue, strategic confusion, and
organizational isolation.” The Peace Movement subsided in the 1980s but the Green
Party which formed in 1980 remains in German Politics occupying 64 seats of the total
622 in Germany’s Bundestag legislative body. 126

124 Pilat, “European Terrorism and the Euromissiles,” 65.

125 Dennis A. Pluchinsky, “Germany’s Red Army Faction: An Obituary,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 16, no. 2 (1993): 135, http://dx.doi.org/10.lQ8Q/10576109308435925 .

126 p ar p es an( j Elections in Europe, accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.parties-and-
elections. eu/germany.html .

IV. TURKEY

Turkish protest and violence against the U.S. military is much like that of
Germany where the majority of conflict arises from issues over of American military
activity and how U.S. forces use locations inside the sovereign territory of Turkey to
carry out U.S. missions. Economic friction points appear to play a lesser role due
Turkey’s overall finical gain from entering NATO, and there is little evidence that social
issues such as crime and racism directly result in large scale protest like those seen in
Okinawa. This chapter will focus on incidents of military activity ranging from the Cold
War to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that caused the Turkish people to protest U.S.
military violations of Turkey’s sovereignty. Incidents that were seen as violations of
sovereignty include the famous shoot down of an American U2 in 1960, the events
surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the crash of another reconnaissance
plane in 1965. The U.S. Arms embargo of 1974 following Turkey’s intervention in
Cyprus, the U.S. lead invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the apprehension of Turkish Special
Forces Officers in the Iraq city of Sulaymaniya also sparked protest as the Turkish people
began to doubt the true intentions of the U.S. Like Germany, both leftists and nationalists
who use popular anti-American notions to carry out their agendas harness the anti-
American sentiment. Unlike anti-Americanism elsewhere, Turkish anti-Americanism is
used domestically between the political left and right ideologies and with the exception of
a few occasions, rarely is violence directed at U.S. personnel. 127 The explanation for this
lack of direction toward American residents in Turkey is not exactly clear as it may be
the result of the complex war between ideologies that dominated Turkish politics in the
1970s to the 1980s, or it may be as Aylin Giiney puts it “that even the most ardent anti-

Americanists knew that Turkey had volunteered for NATO membership and opted for the

128

western bloc—it was not a foreign imposition.”

127 Aylin Giiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no 3
(2008) 475, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200802Q21632 .

128 Ibid.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

Like Germany, there is little evidence showing the U.S. military had a negative
impact on the economic livelihood of Turkish citizens. Turkey’s participation in the
Korean War in 1950 and its acceptance to NATO in 1952 solidified the relationship
between Turkey and the United States. " Following this welcoming to NATO, Turkey
and the U.S. signed several agreements allowing U.S. military units to use Turkish land
and develop facilities in what became known as “Joint Defense Installations.” Over 30
installations with 5,000 U.S. personnel were established to carry out missions that varied
from routine supply operations to sophisticated intelligence gathering. During the height
of the Cold War, the governing Turkish Democratic Party, looking to strengthen its
position with the U.S., also signed a deal authorizing the placement of nuclear missiles on
Turkish soil in hopes that it would help gain access to more U.S. funding and aid during a
rough economic period. Overall, it appears the Turkish-U.S. alliance proved to be
economically beneficial to Turkish citizens.

B. MILITARY FRICTION POINTS

The first indication of strained U.S.-Turkish relations came in 1960s over issues
involving U.S. violations of Turkish sovereignty that coincided with the rise of the
political left. Much like the increase in political activism seen in Okinawa in the years
surrounding the Vietnam War, Turkey also saw a rise political interest among university
students, leftist, and liberal intellectuals. 132 In 1961, intellectuals formed the Turkish
Labor party (TLP) advocating socialism through a parliamentary democracy. The party
never gained more than 3% of the popular vote, but the TLP and its sympathizers were
visible in raising concerns over American imperialism spreading under the guise of

I™ loannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,”
The Middle East Journal 64, no. 1 (2010): 52.

120 Giiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 472.

121 Nur Bilge Criss, “A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 474.

1 32 Ibid., 477.

133 ibid.

NATO and the Joint Defense Installations. 134 Around the same time, three major events
involving the U.S. military strained Turkish relations based on what were seen as
violations of Turkish sovereignty. The Soviet grounding of an American U2
reconnaissance aircraft in 1960, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the crash of an
American RB-57 reconnaissance aircraft into the Black Sea in 1965 gave the left and
other political activists the opportunity to increase the friction between Turkey and the
U.S. military.

In the late 1950s, the U.S. started to use the NATO air base in Incirlik Turkey to
stage reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union using a secret high altitude
surveillance plane known as the U-2. ^ In May 1960, a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary
Powers stationed out of Incirlik flew deep into Soviet territory and was shot down. The
shoot down caused an international incident and involved Turkey in one of the most
famous events of the Cold War. The Turkish press reported that the Turkish
government had no involvement in the issue. On May 8, 1960, the Turkish Foreign
ministry made an announcement stating that Turkey “had never given permission for a
U.S. airplane to make reconnaissance flights from its soil and that Turkey bore no
responsibility for flights outside its airspace.” 137 The results were still damning as the
Soviet government under Nikita Khr ushchev walked out on the Big Four Summit in
Paris, causing President Eisenhower to call off any further missions over Soviet
Territory. 138 The Soviet Union also sent a diplomatic message to Turkey criticizing their
role in the incident by allowing a third party to use Turkish territory for intelligence
collection purposes. Turkish media and politicians criticized the U.S. for the timing of

134 Ibid.

133 Michael M. Gunter, “The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” World Affairs 167, no. 3 (2005) 116,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2067271 7 .

136 Ibid.

1 33 Nur Bilge Criss, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 473.

138 Michael M. Gunter , “The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” 117.

139 Ibid.

the flights so close to the Big Four Summit but stopped short of questioning the overall
validity of the U-2 missions. 140

Two years after the U-2 incident, Turkey was used as a bargaining chip during the
Cuban missile crisis without involvement or knowledge of the Turkish government. In
1959, Turkey authorized the placement of U.S. intennediate range Jupiter (SM-78)
ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads on Turkish soil. 141 During the
crisis in 1962, Turkey became the center of negotiations between President Kennedy and
Soviet Premier Nikita Kh rushchev without any representation from the Turkish
government in Ankara. The two leaders struck a secret deal where the U.S. agreed to
withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and in turn, the Soviet Union agreed to
withdraw the missiles from Cuba. In 1964, the Soviet embassy in Ankara leaked the
details of the U.S.-Soviet agreement, which was adamantly denied by both the U.S. and
Turkish governments. The leftists however, believed the story to be true and used this to
promote anti-American sentiments. 142 Even though Turkey was no doubt safer once the
missiles left the country, the Turkish government felt slighted. After all, the Turkish
government had invested a lot of money in the defense infrastructure with the expectation
that more aid would come with the missile program. The withdrawal of the missiles made
the Turkish public question the alliance with the U.S. and U.S. commitments. The crisis
also made the public aware that unilateral decision in Washington could not only affect
the safety of Turkish citizens but also their existence. 143

In 1965, while Turkey was still dealing with the realizations made in the events
surrounding the Cuban missile crisis, another event involving a U.S. spy plane occurred
when a RB-57 operated by the U.S. Air Force crashed into the Black Sea. The Soviet
Union notified Turkey of the event, but the U.S. decided it would act unilaterally to
recover the aircraft’s remains. The Turkish government felt that the incident was a
Turkish affair and sent Turkish navy and intelligence assets to recover the wreckage. A

1^0 Michael M Gunter, “The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray,” 117.

141 Nur Bilge Criss, “A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 474.

142 Aylin Gtiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 472.

143 ibid.

U.S. destroyer attempted to force its way into the Black Sea by passing through the
Dardanelles while ignoring Turkish inquiries and warnings. The ship was eventually
stopped near Istanbul by the intervention of the Turkish navy. The Turkish navy
recovered the wreckage and the flight data computer concluding that the plane was
travelling west from over the Soviet border when it exceeded the planes maximum
altitude limits and fell apart. 144 Following this incident, Turkey banned all reconnaissance
flights from Turkish soil and attempted to gain control over U.S. activity and the NATO
installations. 145

In the 1960s, issues concerning Turkey’s involvement in NATO came to the
attention of the Turkish public. In 1963, the TLP leaked the secret bilateral agreement
between Turkey and the U.S. When certain details of the agreement were revealed, there
was public outcry causing the Turkish government to renegotiate the terms of the
agreement because some of the clauses were what the left considered violations of
sovereignty. The radicals took the opportunity to protest and requested a complete
withdraw from NATO altogether. There was a core belief among the left that Turkey had
no sovereignty over its own land, and that the U.S. was an imperial power occupying 35
million square meters of Turkish soil. As a result of this occupation, the left argued that
the U.S. was able to control Turkish foreign and domestic policy. The TLP used invented
and embellished anti-American propaganda to cast suspicion of the U.S. military.
Examples of TLP propaganda include using the U.S. Peace Corps for spying on Turkish
citizens, and claiming that Turkish citizens were being deliberately poisoned by U.S.
wheat imports. 146

TLP activities increased by the mid-1960s and anti-American and anti-NATO
slogans became customary at universities and public events. 147 On April 19, 1966 the
U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk traveled to Turkey to attend Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) meetings. When he arrived, the political science debate club from

144 Kli r Bilge Criss, “A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 473.

1 45 ibid., 474.

146 Aylin Gtiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 474.

143 ibid.

Ankara University held a protest meeting to oppose CENTO and NATO on grounds of
their violations on Turkish independence. A Turkish trade union also organized a protest
on behalf of Turkish citizens employed on the military base. These protests proved to be
pivotal because this was the first time that students and laborers went beyond just holding
meetings and took to the streets shouting anti-American propaganda. The right also
became vocal in 1966 by staging demonstrations to counter the now visible left in order

1 A O

to “condemn communism.” This only further entrenched the left who reacted with
more protests to “condemn the United States.” 149 Physical altercations between the
Turkish right and left movements began to occur as the divisions intensified.

Tensions escalated in 1968 when the U.S. Navy’s 6th fleet made a port visit to
Istanbul. University students protested by physically throwing U.S. sailors into the
Bosporus, and a riot between the left and right ensued with the U.S. at the center of the
hostilities. Turkish security forces became involved and a student was killed. 150
Following the incident, the U.S. limited the visibility of its military presence and reduced
port visits by the 6th Fleet. This was also a defining moment Turkish domestic politics as
the left now felt that Turkey was ready for a revolution, and the right mobilized to fight
them. 151

The TLP lost the political elections in 1969, which disillusioned many who hoped
for reform in the parliamentary system. As a result, members of the left began a
campaign of terror and violence aimed the presence of the American military by
attacking U.S. bases. That same year, the car belonging to U.S. Ambassador Robert
Komer was burned by the left activists who thought Komer to be a CIA agent attempting
to infiltrate the left. In 1970 and 1971, several U.S. military personnel were kidnapped
and held briefly before being released. The opinion among U.S. leaders at the time was

148 ]\j ur Bilge Criss, “A short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 477.

149 Ibid.

Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Aylin Giiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 474.

that although the anti-American demonstrators were a minority, they had considerable

153

influence in the press and among university students.

Ultimately, it would be a U.S. lead arms embargo following Turkey’s 1974
intervention in Cyprus that would lead to a collapse in U.S.-Turkish relations. The
embargo that lasted three years was considered by Turkish citizens to be an intrusion in
Turkey’s domestic affairs. The embargo only further fueled anti-American sentiments,
even as limitations were beginning to be lifted as early as 1974. As a result of the
embargo, the Turkish government shut down all U.S. military facilities including air
bases, navy support facilities, radar stations and intelligence collection sites. 154 Turkey
had lost all confidence in the U.S., and further denied the U.S. access to Turkish soil in
1979 to rescue hostages in Tehran during the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Relations did
not begin to heal until after the Cold War ended, but this would be short lived lasting only
until the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003.

In 2003, when the opening stages of the Iraq war began, Turkey’s ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) famously denied the U.S. access to Turkish soil to
conduct missions into northern Iraq in support of the war effort. The AKP did not think it
would get parliamentary approval to support the U.S. without a UN security resolution
specifically authorizing the use of force in Iraq. 155 As tensions between the U.S. and
Turkey increased, an event on July 4, 2003 triggered a major crisis between the two
nations. On this day, U.S. forces apprehended 11 Turkish Special Forces officers in the
northern Iraq city of Sulaymaniya. These soldiers were hooded and taken into custody for
questioning and accused to attempting to assassinate a Kurdish politician. The fallout
from this event was immense as even the strongest supporters of the U.S.-Turkish
alliance became alienated. 156 This action added fuel to the conspiracy theories that the
U.S. was going to establish an independent Kurdish state in Iraq which would result in

153 Ay I in Giiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 475.

154 Ibid.

155 Aylin Giiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 479.

156 toannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?: The Rise of Anti-American Nationalism in Turkey,”
58.

territorial loss for Turkey, and create a new neighbor with deep-rooted animosity towards
Turkey. By 2007, the number of Turks that held a favorable view of the United States fell
to 9% of those polled. This number is even lower than the Palestinians who in the same
poll had a 13% favorable opinion of the U.S. In another 2008 survey, 40% of Turkish

157

citizens polled saw the U.S. as an enemy while only 18% saw it as an ally.

Despite these low approval numbers and with Turkish citizens being generally
suspicious of U.S. intentions, and despite public outrage fueled by the Sulaymaniya
scandal and the Abu Ghraib prison incident, there have not been significant attacks on
U.S. personnel since the Iraq war began. Rather than physical altercations against U.S.
personnel, the outrage has been limited to media portrayals of U.S. soldiers in books and
film. A famous Turkish book titled Metal Storm depicts a war between Turkey and the
U.S. in the near future. The plot involves a U.S. invasion of Turkey from Iraq followed
by an occupation of major Turkish cities. The book concludes after a Turkish agent
detonates a bomb in Washington D.C. Metal Storm became an instant success selling
500,000 copies in 18 months and ran ten editions. Turkish readers received the book as
a realistic scenario that “satisfied the psychological mood and desire of Turks to vent
their feelings against American policies in their part of the world.” 159

A 2006 movie titled The Valley of Wolves: Iraq was the biggest budget Turkish
film ever made with an estimated budget of $10 million. The film portrays American
soldiers chewing gum and killing innocent people at an Iraqi wedding. The film also
features a Jewish-American doctor who harvests organs from prisoners at Abu Ghraib in
order to sell them in Israel and the United States. The hero of the film takes revenge for
the Sulaymaniya arrest of the Turkish Special Forces members and single handedly
brings peace to Iraq. The Valley of Wolves was extremely successful in Turkey, drawing
an audience of 1.2 million people in the first three days. The wife of the Turkish Prime
Minister, Emine Erdogan screened the film and stated, “I feel so proud of them all.” 160

157 Ibid., 59.

158 loannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?” 61.

159 Ay I in Gtiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 483.

160 Ibid.

Similarly, the head of the Turkish parliament Bulent Arinc praised the film for its
realism. U.S. officials largely ignored the film and saw no significance but some
expressed concern about the support the film received from high-ranking Turkish
officials. 161 There may be some degree of accuracy to Aylin Guney’s remark that media
satisfies the psychological mood of the Turk’s, because despite the skepticism and the
less than favorable views of Americans in polls, there has been no real documented
activity directed at American service members or civilians living in Turkey.

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

In the 1950s, not only were American troops arriving in Turkey, so too was
American pop culture. Adding to support the influx of American culture was Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes policy to create “a little America” in Turkey. Despite the
sudden arrival of American troops and their culture, there was little public resistance or
opposing sentiment. By the 1960s-1970s, anti-American sentiment was strong but this
appears to be a result of American policy and the appearance of American colonialism
rather than cultural misunderstandings or crime caused by Americans. Similarly, the low
opinion polls of American following the opening stages in the war in Iraq seem to stem
more from policy rather than interaction with American service members. Tensions
appear to be based on the questionability of U.S. intentions and the strength of the
alliance. There is little evidence to show that crime or racist acts committed by U.S.
personnel have added to hostilities like they have in Okinawa.

D. CONCLUSION

In terms of duration, the conflict over military friction points in Turkey runs
almost as long as the situation in Okinawa beginning in the 1960s, but the actual amount
of violence and protest is lower. Today, anti-Americanism in Turkey cuts across all
sections of Turkish society. Global polls reveal that Turkey is a place where Americans

161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.

have the lowest favorability. 164 Anti-American sentiment spans the political spectrum
from the far left, to the religious right and the secularists. 16 ^ Much of this animosity was
originated during the Cold War over disagreements over military activity and how the
U.S. should be allowed to use Turkish soil to carry out missions against the Soviet Union.
Concerns over violations of Turkish sovereignty were exacerbated during the Cuban
missile crisis when the U.S. negotiated the withdrawal of nuclear missiles based in
Turkey without Turkish representation. By the 1960s, leftist activists and members of the
TLP used anti-American propaganda to gain support for their cause which ignited some
altercations against U.S. personnel as seen in the 6th fleet incident. With the exception of
6th fleet, and some kidnappings of U.S. personnel, the violence was mostly targeted
between the Turkish left and members of the Turkish right who feared the spread of
communism. This nuance makes Turkey unique in that anti-Americanism was used by
the elites to direct hostility between Turkish citizens and not against U.S. service
members.

By the start of the Iraq war, Turkish public opinion of Americans was at an all-
time low. Concerns over how the Bush administration declared war without a UN
resolution coupled with the Sulaymaniya incident and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal
helped to ignite public indignation. Despite this widespread animosity and the negative
portrayal of American servicemen in popular media, there have not been any significant
attacks on U.S. military personnel stationed in Turkey. Public sentiment in Turkey is
thought to have improved with the election of President Obama and the end of hostilities
in Iraq but the anti-American trend has not been significantly reversed. 166

164 Aylin Giiney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 484.
Ibid.

166ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Friends No More?: 66.

V. BAHRAIN

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the nature of the political protests in
Bahrain in order to determine the conditions under which the Bahraini people either took
to the streets in large protests, or carried out violent acts against their government.
Bahrain has a long history of protest going back to the early 1900s. Economic, military,
and social friction points play a role in the protest between the Bahraini citizens and the
monarchy at varying degrees. Economic concerns united the Sunni and Shia citizens in
1938 and 1954 in order to protest labor interests. Social friction points make up the
causes for the majority of the protests. The largest example of this type of protest is the
Arab Spring in 2011. Bahrain is also unique, because unlike Okinawa, Germany, and
Turkey, there is little evidence based on outward protest to show that Bahraini people
disapprove of Bahrain’s military involvement in regional conflicts, or its close
relationship with the U.S. The current predominant Bahraini opposition movement, A1
Wifaq, has not directed hostility at the U.S. does not seem harbor ill will at this juncture.
This chapter will summarize the economic, military and social conflicts throughout
Bahrain’s history and will conclude with the events surrounding the Arab Spring.

A. ECONOMIC FRICTION POINTS

To say that the nature of the protests in Bahrain is purely sectarian overlooks
Bahrain’s history as a cosmopolitan center with a thriving middle class that includes both
Sunni and Shia citizens. The existence of this middle class is due largely to Bahrain’s
geographic location making it an urban society and a center for commerce in the gulf
region. 167 The lack of water and grazing land also prevented Bahrain from the “parochial
tribalism of the other countries on the Arabian peninsula.” By the nineteenth century,
Bahrain was the largest trading center in the Gulf with heavy influences from the Arab,
Persian, and Indian cultures that did business on the island. 169 These geographic and

167 Stephen Zunes, “Bahrain’s Arrested Revolution'’ Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2013) 151,
http://www.istor.Org/stable/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.2.0149 .

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

ethnic influences “reinforced traditions of cosmopolitanism, tolerance and pluralism.” 170
At two points in Bahrain’s history, economic friction points actually unite the two sects
in protesting against the monarchy. Sunni and Shia laborers came together in the 1938 to
conduct labor strikes for better working conditions at the Bahrain Petroleum Company’s
(BAPCO) oil fields shortly following the discovery of oil on the island. In 1954, taxi
drivers went on strike to protest new insurance regulations and demanded a trade union.
The taxi protest lead the creation of the Cooperative Compensation Society, and other
nonsectarian groups that intended to bring both Sunni and Shia businessmen together
over shared interests.

Oil was discovered in Bahrain in 1932, which lead to the creation of BAPCO and
the development oil drills and refineries. 171 By 1938, labor strikes from both Sunni and
Shia oil field workers became a regular occurrence. In a bit of foreshadowing, the al-
Khalifa family relied on support from foreign governments, India in this case, to help
suppress opposition movements. 172 On November 1, 1938, a petition was created by five
prominent figures from both the Sunni and Shia sects. Among their demands were calls
for legislative, judicial, and education refonns. Economically, the petition requested the
establishment of trade unions and the hiring preferences for Bahraini nationals over
foreign labor. 17 ’ British officials also attributed the overall decline of the economic
situation resulting from a decline in the pearl market, and the dissatisfaction with police
services as additional causes for bringing the Sunni and Shia sects together. 174

The British advisor to the King, Sir Charles Belgrave, developed a plan to divide
the Sunni and Shia alliance. Belgrave neutralized the Shia by agreeing to some of the
judicial and legislative reforms that effectively removed the Shia from the alliance. Later
in 1938, Belgrave and the al-Khalifa’s intended to put an end to the opposition by
arresting the remaining Sunni reformers. What Belgrave and the al-Khalifas failed to

170 Ibid.

1 7 1 Falah al-Mdaires, “Schism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” Digest of Middle East Studies Spring,
(2002) 21, doi: 10.1111/j.1949-3606.2002.tb00440.x.

172 Ibid., 23.

173 Ibid., 24.

174 Ibid.

realize, was the discovery of oil created a labor class, which was not sectarian—based.
This realization would be immediately apparent following the arrest of the Sunni
reformers. After the arrest, both Sunni and Shia laborers went on a general strike at
BAPCO raising the same demands previously made in the petition. 17j Belgrave’s attempt
at divide and rule had failed because he did not understand that the strikes were economic
and that economics would be enough to unite both sects. This coherence would also
occur later in labor strikes in 1943, which made improvements to the social situation for
both sects. 176

Economics would also play a major role in a strike held by taxi drivers in 1954.
On September 24th, taxi drivers went on strike over the government’s decision to force
all taxi drivers to purchase insurance from British companies at a high rate. The drivers
went on strike demanding the repeal of this mandate, the creation of a taxi driver labor
union, and a cancelation of the bridge toll on the bridge that connected Manamah to
Muhraraq. A local newspaper called Sawt al-Bahrain, which was created by intellectuals
from both sects, picked up the taxi drivers’ cause. They used the taxi strike to promote a
unification of the two sects and pressured the government to allow the creation of the
Cooperative Compensation Society (CCS), which promoted the business interests of both
sects. 177

The leadership of the CCS went on to create the Higher Executive Committee
(HEC) consisting of four prominent members from each sect. The HEC called for
legislative reform and the formation of trade unions. On November 17, 1954 the HEC
used the celebration of the Prophet’s birth to rally thousands of people into signing a
petition to allow the HEC to present their concerns to the Government. The government
refused, causing a massive general strike in December 1954, with an estimated 90% of
the public participating. 178 The British began to fear the strike would spread to other areas
including Kuwait and Qatar, and ultimately negotiated with the HEC after the general

175 Ibid., 24.

176 Ibid.

177 Ibid., 25

178 Ibid., 26.

strike. The HEC became known as the Committee for National Unity (CNU) and
negotiated the creation of the Bahraini Labor Union.

The CNU was successful in promoting other strikes and social protests, which
united the two sects in a struggle for autonomy from Britain. Following a strike over
British control of Egypt in 1956, the leaders of the CNU were tried and exiled to the
British crown colony Saint Helena Island. This exile and crackdown on the CNU caused
the creation of underground Marxist and nationalist political groups including the Arab
Nationalist Movement, and the Bahraini Liberation Front. 179

Despite the large strikes and turmoil caused by economic concerns, and even
though the oil supplies are running out, Bahrain’s economy remains strong today. Oil
refining and the extraction of natural gas, as well as aluminum processing, light
manufacturing, ship building and commerce all play major roles in replacing the income
lost with the drying oil wells. Bahrain has a per capita income of $26,000, which puts it
on the same economic footing as Greece. Literacy is estimated to be at 90% and the life
expectancy is comparable to most of Europe. This combined with its less restrictive laws
that attract tourists from around the Gulf, makes Bahrain one of the better-off nations in
the Middle East in terms of economically. 180

B. MILITARY FICTION POINTS

Where the military is concerned, there appears to be little in the way of conflict.
In the other cases discussed in this thesis, citizens were concerned about their sovereign
territory being used to carry out wars or actions against neighboring countries. Bahrain is
somewhat unique in that if appears to be the only exception in our case studies where
there is a lack of protest stemming from the military friction point. Bahrain is currently
home of NAVCENT and the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet Headquarters. The command is
housed at the 100-acre Naval Support Activity-Bahrain with approximately 5,000
assigned personnel. Throughout multiple conflicts, Bahrain has been a strong ally to

179 Ibid., 27.

Stephen Zunes, “Bahrain’s Arrested Revolution” Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2013) 151.

181 U.S. Library of Congress, Bahrain: Reform, 23.

the U.S. Bahrain played a key role in the Gulf War, and more recently in Operations
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In the 1991 Gulf War, Bahrain played host to 1,300 U.S. personnel during the
containment phase of the conflict, and once the war commenced, Bahraini pilots flew
combat missions over Iraq. As a consequence for their participation, Iraq fired nine scud
missiles at Bahrain, three of which actually landed on the island. This makes Bahrain
unique again in that it is the only country in the case study to actually receive direct
action as a result of its support of the United States. Despite this fact, Bahrain hosted the
regional headquarters for the UN weapons inspectors from 1991-1998, as well as the
Multi-National force in charge of the embargo on Iraq from 1991-2003. 182

Bahrain and the UAE are the only two Gulf countries to deploy forces to
Afghanistan in support of OEF. Bahrain allowed the U.S. to fly combat missions from
Shaykh Isa Air Base for both OEF and OIF as well as host 4000 troops on their way to
Afghanistan. Bahrain also made a public display of deploying its warship named Subhci
in order to protect U.S. ships in the gulf, and sent troops and equipment to Kuwait to
support the efforts in Iraq. 183

With the exceptions of the tensions between the government in Iraq and Bahrain
over the support of the opposition, there seems to be little attention given to U.S. military
activity in Bahrain. While U.S.-Bahraini relations may be strained over the unrest, the
“defense cooperation has not suffered significantly.” 184 So despite the U.S. voicing
concerns over the crackdown, the government has not made moves against the U.S.
military in retaliation. Similarly, leaders of al-Wifaq indicate that should the Shiite
opposition gain more control in the government, “defense relations will not be at risk.” 185
Whether or not this is just an attempt by al-Wifaq to placate the United States, remains to
be seen. For the time being the Navy has no plan to relocate this facility. In July 2011,
NACENT issued a statement refuting a British release claiming that the Navy was

182 Ibid., 24.

183 Ibid., 25.

184 Ibid., 23.

185 Ibid., 21.

looking to relocate its facilities to either the UAE or Qatar. 186 Since there appears to be
no ill will from either side on Bahrain’s security alliance with the U.S., the Navy seems
content on remaining so long as the status quo goes unchanged.

C. SOCIAL FRICTION POINTS

Despite the strong standing of the overall Bahraini economy, social conflict
between the Shia and the al-Khalifa monarchy remains persistent. These tensions are
primarily due to the lack of Shia political representation in the government, coupled with
human rights violations, and discrimination against the Shia majority. Bahraini society
can be divided into three main categories. First are the Shia majority, which makes up the
labor class, and second are the Sunni minority who are members of many levels of
society. The third and highest social category in the hierarchy is the Sunni al-Khalifa
monarchy, which has ruled the island since 1783. 187 After conquering the island, the al-
Khalifas claimed the lands as personal property “on the foundation of victorious
rights.” They have governed the island ever since. Conflicts between the Shia and the
Sunni monarchy are the strongest social friction point in Bahrain’s society. This section
will focus on the role of the sectarian divide in the general strike of 1922, the attempts by
the British government to exploit sectarianism throughout the 1950s-1960s, and will
briefly highlight the events surrounding the Arab Spring in 2011.

As early as the 1920s, foreigners took notice of the sectarian divide in Bahrain.
The British political representative in Bahrain, Lieutenant Trevor, commented on the
Shia grievances by stating, “They have no refuge...their properties are subject to plunder,
and their selves liable to maltreatment at any moment...They suffered from slavery order
and they are not acceptable in heading any institution.” In February 1922, a general
strike was held in the Manamah Bazaar that resulted in a protest demonstration against
“the practices of an oppressing authority.” 190 The protest was enough to motivate British

186 Ibid., 24.

18 ^ Falah al-Mdaires, “Schism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” 21.

188 Ibid.

189 Ibid., 22.

190 Ibid.

political representatives to abdicate Isa bin Ali in 1923 and replace him with his son
Sheikh Hamad. Along with the abdication, Britain also pressured the monarchy to create
a new customs, police, and judicial system in order to appease the Shia protestors. 191 This
was the earliest start of British interventions that would last until the 1960s.

Along with Britain’s attempts to intervene economically, it also attempted to
apply its colonial “divide and rule” practices. A gentleman named Sir Charles Belgrave,
who served as a British advisor to the al-Khalifa court from the 1950s-1960s, made
deliberate attempts divide Sunni and Shia sects socially in the interest of maintaining the
economic a status quo. A blatant example of this attempt by Belgrave and the Khalifa’s is
the clashes that occurred between the sects during an Ashura procession in 1953. It is
believed that a high-ranking police official, an al-Khalifa family member, was placed in
charge of a group of intelligence officers who were ordered to throw bottles at the Shia
marching in an Ashura procession. Following the attack on the procession, they traveled
to Muharraq to “lead Sunni fanatics in attacking Shia residences.” Staged events like
this became emblematic of clashes from 1953-1954, wherein Belgrave, “pretended to be
the defender of Shia and their rights, while Salman bin Hamad al-Kahlifa pretended to be
the defender of the Sunni and their rights.” 193

The division between the two sects grew between the 1970s-1990s. This was due
in large part by the desire of the West to “maintain the status quo to ensure a secure the
flow of oil resources from the region.” 194 Today, Shia citizens still make up the majority
of Bahrain’s population, but the exact numbers are difficult to assess. Adding to the
trouble of counting Sunni versus Shia in Bahrain was the government’s policy to grant
citizenship to “10,000 Sunni families from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and
Pakistan to work in the military and security forces.” 195 It should also be noted that Shia
are not allowed to enlist in the Bahraini military due to the monarchy questioning their

191 Ibid.

192 Ibid., 25.

193 Ibid., 25.

19 4 Steven Wright, “Fixing the Kingdom: Political Evolution and Socio-Economic changes in
Bahrain,” Center for International Regional Studies, 2010, 9.

195 Ibid.

loyalty. Shia citizens see the granting citizenship to foreigners as Sunni attempts to
change the population demographic to their favor. 196 To add further injury, Bahraini Shia
face higher unemployment and as a result of these citizenship grants, they are seeing
good jobs and salaries going to non-Bahrainis. 197 Tensions between the sects remained
high from the 1970s to the 1990s, and peaked in 1994-1998, when anti-government
violence from Shiite citizens was a daily occurrence. 198

In 1999, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa ascended the throne and began
implementing social and political refonns. To symbolize the new attitude of the
monarchy, he changed his title to “Amir” which implies more accountability to his
people, and he established a referendum in 2002 to create a new constitution, and a
National Assembly (parliament). 199 The Shiite criticized these reforms because they gave
an equal distribution of seats to both sects, and the Shia wanted an electoral process that
would allow them to translate their numbers as a majority into political strength. 200
Elections into the Bahraini Council of Representatives (COR) are held every four years
and these elections are highly contested by the Shia citizens who perceive that the
government is consistently rigging the outcomes with the intention on blocking a Shia
majority in the COR. 201

Political parties are outlawed in Bahrain, so political societies are created to fill a
party role come election time. 202 The largest Shia political party is the Al-Wifaq National
Islamic Society. A Shia cleric, named Shaykh Ali al-Sahnan is considered the core leader
of the opposition protest movement. Due to his status as a cleric, he does not participate
as a candidate in COR elections. He is known to be visible with Shia protestors and
sustained a minor injury by Bahraini Security Forces during a protest in June 2012.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid.

198 U.S. Library of Congress, Bahrain: Reform, 2.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid., 3.

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid.

Another major al-Wifaq personality is a Shiite cleric named Isa Qasim who is in his late
seventies. Isa Qasim is considered “fiery” and is generally “resistant to many proposals to
settle the crisis.” 203

Another Shia party with influence is the Al-Haq Movement. Unlike al-Wifaq, Al-
Haq will not settle on refonn, instead their goal is a complete regime change away from a
monarchy. This hard line has made Al-Haq illegal in Bahrain and therefore it has a
smaller membership base than Al-Wifaq. 204 Al-Haq leaders are also said to have ties with
Iran and with other Islamist movements in the Middle East. Leaders of Al-Haq include
Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace and Hassan Mushaima. 205

The 2010 National Assembly elections held in October brought each of the Shiite
political societies to the forefront and laid the foundation for the uprising in 2011. Al-
Wifaq ran some candidates in the election while Al-Haq boycotted over claims of
government gerrymandering. Just before the election, 23 Shiite leaders were arrested on
charges of attempting to overthrow the government. A total of 160 Shiite citizens were
arrested that month under a new anti-terrorism law that gave the government broad
arresting powers. Dr Alsingace was arrested in August, and a popular Shiite cleric
Ayatollah Hussein Mirza al-Najati had his Bahraini citizenship revoked. 206 Observers
believe that the government crackdown was an attempt to drive Shiite voters to al-Haq
thereby keeping them from voting in the election due to al-Haq’s boycott. While this may
have worked, it caused an increase in demonstrations in Shiite neighborhoods as well as a
bombing of four police cars. 207 Once the Arab Spring swept across Egypt, it spread to
Bahrain and emboldened the Shia opposition.

On February 14, 2011, Bahraini motivated by the events that overthrew Hosni
Mubarak in Egypt took to the streets. After a few days of minor protests and clashes with
Bahraini security forces, a crowd of predominantly Shia demonstrators converged on a

203 Ibid.

204 Ibid., 4.

203 Ibid.

206 Ibid., 5.

207 Ibid.

traffic circle known as Pearl Roundabout. The protestors demanded more power to the
COR, and the halt of the alleged gerrymandering that kept the Shia from achieving a
majority in the COR. Shiite protestors also demanded more jobs and opportunities, and
an end to their second-class citizenship and their label as “untrustworthy.” 208

On February 17, security forces forcibly removed demonstrators from the
roundabout with rubber bullets, and teargas. Four demonstrators were killed during the
raid and others died shortly after. The Bahraini government claimed that it did this to
prevent the situation from entering a “sectarian abyss,” and a civil war. 209 At the same
time, Britain closed its embassy in Bahrain and stopped all anns imports into the
country 210

The U.S. urged the Bahraini government to pull back from clashes with the Shia
protestors who then reclaimed the roundabout on February 19. 211 On February 22, the
largest of the protests occurred as Shiite citizens blocked roads for miles around the
roundabout. In order to take pressure off the situation, King Hamad pardoned and
released 308 prisoners, and allowed Al-Haq’s leader Hassan Mushaima to return from
exile. The King also relieved two family members who held posts in offices that affect
jobs and quality of life on the island. 212

In March, Crown Prince Salman opened dialogue and promised reforms that
would allow the parliament to have full authority and a government that met the will of
the people with fair district boundaries and voting measures 213 These appeals were seen
as too little too late, to the many protestors who shifted to Al-Haq. The people no longer
wanted refonn; instead they wanted an overthrow. Al-Wifaq remained moderate and was

208 Ibid., 7.

209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.

211 Ibid., 8

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

hopeful that dialogue would bring change, but even still refused to enter formal talks with
the King. 214

With the Kingdom at a standstill and with no formal dialogue, the protests
escalated. Protestors blocked the entrances to the financial district, causing the
government to fear a heavy impact on the islands economy. 215 The government appealed
to the GCC for assistance. Many are aware that Saudi Arabia spearheaded the request by
sending 1,200 armored troops over the causeway, but few realize that the UAE sent 600
police forces, and Kuwait sent Naval Units to help secure the island. 216 The government
with its borders now secured, used its forces to clear and destroy the Pearl Roundabout on
March 18, 2011. Many Shia hardliners were once again arrested including Mushaima.
Following the incident, Shia members of the judiciary, members of the council, and other
government positions either left their jobs temporarily or quit altogether.

In the months following the GCC crackdown, the King initiated the Bahrain
Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) to investigate the allegations violence and
torture. The BICI presented its report on November 23, 2011. The five-member
commission detennined that 35 deaths are attributed to the unrest between February 14
and April 15 2011. 217 Security Forces killed a total of 13 people in clashes. Of these 13,
wounds inflicted from a shotgun killed seven; five were killed by “another type of
firearm”; and one was beaten to death. 218 Five people died as the result of torture; three
while in the custody of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), one after being released to the
hospital by Bahrain’s National Security Agency, and one death occurred four days after
the individual was released from MOI custody. 219 The report also mentions that
demonstrators killed three police officers, and one officer was accidently killed by the

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid.

216 Ibid., 9.

217 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, M. Cherif Bassiouni, and Nigel S. Rodley. Report of
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011, 219.

218 Idid., 223.

219 Ibid.

Bahraini Defense Force (BDF). 220 The report appeared to have been thorough in
investigating the allegations of death and torture on both sides of the conflict, and was
headed by Dr. Cherif Bassiouni a renowned legal expert. Despite the appearance of
openness, many Shia leaders accused the document and Bassiouni of being bias “in favor
of exonerating top government officials 221

Since 2011, events in Bahrain have been largely at an impasse. On February 14,
2012, one year after the uprising started, protestors attempted to retake the Pearl
Roundabout but were stopped by Bahraini security forces. The largest demonstration to
date was the one on March 9, 2012 to protest the anniversary of the GCC intervention.
The March protest was also meant to highlight the Formula One race held annually in
Bahrain. Protests also increased in the days leading up to the race. The race was still held
amid international concerns and a low spectator turnout. 222 After a clashes turned deadly
in September and October of 2012, the Bahraini government banned all rallies and
demonstrations. 223

Despite the ban on protests, the potential for violence remains. In June 2012,
bomb-making materials were found in several locations around the island, and in
November 2012 five explosions killed two non-Bahrainis.“ Violence continued into
2013 with a car bomb attack outside a mosque in a Sunni neighborhood during the holy
month of Ramadan. In 2014, the situation has continued in similar fashion to 2013.
The use of car bombs remains regular in 2014 beginning with the explosion of a car
bomb on April 7, 2014 in the largely expat populated area of Manama during the 2014
Bahrain Formula One Grand Prix.” While no one was injured in the April 7th incident,

220 Ibid., 220.

22 1 U.S. Library of Congress, Bahrain: Reform, 10.

222 Ibid., 14.

223 Ibid., 15.

224 Ibid., 16.

223 Farishta Saeed, “Bahrain Jails Four for Car Bomb Outside Mosque,” Chicago Tribune, November
10, 2013, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-bahrain-court-20131110,0,5596996.story .

22 6 “Bi as t Rocks Bahrain During Grand Prix,” Aljaz.eera, April 7 2014,
http://www.aliazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/04/blast-rocks-bahrain-during-grand-prix-

201447675399917.html

two people were killed and a third was severely wounded by later car explosion only 12
days later on April 19th. 227

The lack of progress is attributed to both sides that appear to be stifled by
hardliners. Within the government, al-Khalifa family members and Sunni leaders who
felt the plan was too “conciliatory” struck down many attempts including a March 2012
plan to appease the opposition. 228 Similarly, many blame the opposition for being
unwilling to negotiate after the crackdown and GCC intervention. The Bahraini
government, its moderate political societies, and the United States should be concerned
with the increase in the formation of anti-compromise factions who are looking to bring
the collapse of the regime by waging protests and taking part in activities that are
intended to collapse the Bahraini economy. 229 This lack of progress and the entrenchment
of Shia toward regime change should cause concern for Bahraini and U.S. policy makers.
The social friction point does not seem to be going away.

D. CONCLUSION

A brief examination in the nature of protest in Bahrain reveals that the current
situation of unrest is the result of social tensions based on unemployment, and unequal
Shiite representation within the Bahraini government. To say that the nature of the protest
is purely sectarian would be far too simple a statement. True, the uprising appears to be
divided between the sects, but the research indicates that theological differences are not at
the heart of the struggle. The evidence suggests that much of the conflict stems from
economic and social friction points.

In the early part of the 1900s to the 1950s, the two sects actually united against
the monarchy over economic concerns that lead to the abdication of the king in 1923.
Fearing that the two sides would become too powerful in their opposition, the Bahraini
monarchy along with British advisors successfully divided the sects under divide and rule

227 “T wo killed in Bahrain Car Explosion,” BBC News, April 19, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-27086763 .

228 U.S. Library of Congress, Bahrain: Reform, 16.

229 Ibid.

style practices. The government and foreign investors favored the status quo with the
divided sects because it reduced turmoil and allowed for the predictable flow oil and
other resources from the region.

There has been little evidence to show that Bahrain’s alignment with the U.S. has
caused a significant protest from the Shiite and Sunni citizens. This makes Bahrain
unique in these case studies in that this is the only country that did not protest against the
activities of the U.S. military in the region. Bahrain was a major ally in the Gulf War,
OEF, and OIF. Bahraini air bases and ports were used to conduct combat missions as
well as serve as a staging point for men and materiel to enter the region. Both the
government and the leaders of the opposition movement have expressed support for the
U.S. defense structure. 230

Social tensions grew throughout the 1900s, peaking in the mid-1990s. When King
Hamad came to power in 1999, he attempted to implement some reform and
representation while still maintaining his absolute authority. Election cycles in the early
2000s were plagued by accusations of corruption, and gerrymandering that kept the Shiite
community from achieving a majority in the government. Opposition leaders seized upon
the momentum from the Arab Spring in 2011 to motivate the Shiite community into a
large-scale protest. The protest was met with strong resistance and a crackdown from the
Bahraini government and its GCC allies. The resulting deaths and allegations of torture
on the part of the government have led many moderate Shia to harden their resolve and
shift from a refonn movement to a complete overthrow of the regime. The situation
remains at a stalemate with the government unwilling to give into sweeping reform
demands, and the Shiite unwilling to accept a deal that falls short of a democracy that
represents the Shiite political majority. With approximately 5,000 personnel stationed at
NAVCENT and its supporting facilities, the U.S. military needs to remain vigilant in
monitoring the opposition movement and the government for signs increased conflict.

230 Ibid., 23.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. FINDINGS

After reviewing each of the case studies, we have seen the three main categories
of friction points ignite some level of protest or violence. The country with greatest
amount of prolonged protest activity against the U.S. military is Okinawa. This is to be
expected since Okinawa meets the criteria for all three friction points. The remaining
countries have one or two friction points as indicated in Table 1.

Economic

Military

Social

Okinawa

Gennany

Turkey

Bahrain

Table 1. Friction Point Matrix

In Okinawa, the American acquisition of land led to largest protests of up to
160,000 citizens, making economics a significant friction point. U.S. military attempts to
use Okinawa for combat operations during the Vietnam War lead to short but intense
periods of protests. The hazards of continual military activity on the safety of Okinawan
citizens who live near the base and the effects of these operations on the environment
have led low levels to protests that continue to this day. The rape case in 1995 brought
85,000 from across Okinawan society to the streets to call for the removal of U.S. bases.
The rape case made the social friction point one that can unite broad classes in society

under one cause. Racist attitudes or indifference by U.S. personnel as evidenced by the

Pacific Fleet Commander’s comments toward Okinawans is an area worth further
research in order to see to what extent racism had on U.S. policy.

Germany has one of the shortest durations of protest, stemming from the U.S.
and NATO decision to place nuclear weapons on Gennan soil. Like Okinawa, the protest
had little effect on U.S. policy and the missiles were still placed on the German border.
Germany is unique however, in that it had some of the more spectacular acts of violence
due to the hijacking of the anti-nuclear protests by radical elements on the fringe of the
Peace Movement. Economic trigger points are not seen, due in large part by post WWII
agreements that left Gennany to focus on its economy and political role in Europe
without having to spend money on defense which was supplied by the U.S. The levels of
racism and social conflict seen in Okinawa are not present in Gennany. Further study
may be needed to better understand why Americans interacted differently with Gennany
than it did with Japan following WWII.

In Turkey, anti-Americanism became a central theme in Turkish politics, but the
actual acts of protests and violence directed at Americans was rather limited to some
kidnappings and the physical altercations that occurred during the 6th Fleet port visit.
Protests erupted from military friction points stemming from what were seen as U.S.
military violations of Turkish sovereignty during the Cold War. These trigger points
include the scandals involving U.S. spy planes flying missions into Russia from Turkish
soil as well as the deal made between the U.S. and the Soviet Union without Turkey’s
consent during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003,
Turkey became the most anti-American country in the world according to opinion polls.
The low approval rating is attributed to questions concerning the true intentions of the
U.S. following the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, as well as the Sulaymaniya incident.
There is little evidence to show that economics or social friction points played a
significant role in causing protest.

The nature of the current protest in Bahrain is centered on social friction points

and the hostility is directed at the Bahraini government. Research indicates that early on,

economic friction points could actually unite the Sunni and Shia sects in coordinating

general strikes for better labor conditions and job opportunities. These strikes even led to

the abdication of the king in 1922. In tenns of military friction points, the U.S. military
staged multiple operations and flew combat missions out of Bahrain in the Gulf War,
OEF, and OIF. Bahrain was also one of the few GCC nations to contribute troops to these
campaigns. Bahrain is unique in our case studies in that it is the only country where
military activities did not lead to a significant amount of protest. Social protests have a
history of being large in Bahrain with the largest and most violent occurring during the
Arab Spring in 2011. Today, large protests have been largely eliminated, but some still
continue as seen by the protests marking the anniversary of the Arab Spring and the GCC
crackdown. The annual Formula One Race also continues to spark protests as Shia
citizens attempt to use the race as a platform bring international attention to their cause.

B. LESSONS LEARNED

The research confirms the second hypothesis that tensions between the U.S.
military and Bahraini citizens do not exist because the leadership of the opposition has
not directed hostilities in towards the United States. Although the current unrest in
Bahrain has not directed its focus on the U.S. military, there are still lessons to be learned
from the case studies. Okinawa has taught us that economic friction points ignited by the
U.S. can bring about the largest protest. The same was seen in Bahrain in the early 1920s
when the Sunni and Shia sects united against the monarchy. Economics affect society
across the board regardless of class or interests. Okinawa also indicates to us that social
friction points such as crime committed by U.S. service members can draw large sections
of society together, especially if NGOs and the media support the cause.

Germany taught us that even a nonviolent protest movement is vulnerable to
extremism and violence by radicals acting on its fringes. Had it not been for the
leadership of the German Peace Movement redirecting the nature of the movement’s
activities by the time of the 1983 Easter Sunday protests; the radicals could have taken
the country over the edge into a more violent situation. With the unrest in Bahrain at a
stalemate and with the trenches between the government and the Shia getting deeper,
there is a higher likelihood of radicals entering with the scene. The strength of the

moderate leaders like al-Wifaq in Bahrain is essential to keeping the fringes from
hijacking the opposition.

Turkey is unique in that anti-Americanism was used to cause turmoil within
Turkish national politics. This factor could certainly come up in Bahrain. Although anti-
American sentiments are rarely seen in Bahrain, it is possible that the presence of the
U.S. may be used as a political agenda by the opposition movement to attract more
support, or to influence the U.S. into changing its policies in supporting the monarchy.
The moderate leaders of al-Wifaq have expressed that the country’s relationship with the
U.S. military will not change if the opposition gains power in the government, but if al-
Haq continues to attract more hardliners; there is no guarantee that the current
harmonious relationship will remain.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the lessons learned from each case study and their potential to affect us
in Bahrain, this thesis proposes four recommendations:

1) Commanders and policy makers should monitor al-Wifaq and other opposition
movements closely. The silence of Al-Wifaq following the recent car bombs should be
concerning. The silence of the moderate opposition leaders means one of two things. It
could mean that al-Wifaq is at a minimum giving tacit support to car bombs as a
legitimate form of protest, or it could mean that al-Wifaq’s leadership is losing control of
its fringes and they are choosing more radical options to break the current impasse. If al-
Wifaq’s membership or influence declines, the people could possibly be moving to more
radical groups.

2) Commanders need to abstain from making decisions that will make drastic
changes in the Bahraini economy. Closing or reducing the size of the current base will
cause changes in the local sectors of the economy that rely heavily on American
consumers or contracts. Okinawa taught us that economic concerns can unite all levels of
society regardless of social class.

3) Commanders need to continue policies that promote good order and discipline.
This is essential in keeping social friction points from igniting. An incident of rape like
the one in Okinawa can also have a uniting effect among the social classes. Should the
elites decide to direct focus on an incident such as this, the two sects could unite against
Americans no matter what sect the victim was in.

4) Special attention is needed to security in the days surrounding the Formula One
race. The race can provide an international stage to bring members to the opposition’s
cause. Not only would an attack or large protests are visible, but also it would discredit
the monarchy on the world stage while it hosts an event to help improve its image.

D. IMPLICATIONS

The fact that Bahrain appears to be at a stalemate should not bring a sense of
comfort and security to commanders and policy makers. Bahrain is unique in that the
U.S. military has not yet caused one of the three friction points to ignite, but that does not
mean the situation is not volatile. Previous experiences with protests or violence in
forward basing show us that anyone of these points poised to spark a significant protest
or violence. Commanders need to be aware of the size and duration of protest that
economic, military and social friction points can cause. We also need to be aware that
anti-Americanism can play a role in internal politics to help draw undecided citizens into
the conflict. Finally, commanders and policy makers also need to maintain an awareness
of the opposition’s fringe actors as well as the strength and influence of the moderate
leadership. If the impasse between the opposition and al-Khalifa monarchy continues, the
U.S. may eventually find itself at the center of protest or other hostilities.

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